Duguin: profeta de Eurasia

Duguin: profeta de Eurasia

Alberto Buela

Alexander Duguin (Moscú, 1952) se ha transformado hay en el más significativo geopolitólogo ruso. Inscripto en la ideología nacional bolchevique del estilo de Ernst Nietkisch sostiene un socialismo de los narodi. Esto es, un socialismo de los pueblos, despojado de todas las taras modernas como su materialismo, su ateísmo y su ilustración.

Su teoría geopolítica es la construcción de un gran espacio euroasiático con centralidad en Rusia.

En este libro que comentamos, traducción al portugués de Aganist the west (2012),  se va a ocupar en primer lugar de qué entiende por Occidente, que a partir del nacimiento de la modernidad, pasando por sus distintas etapas - Renacimiento, Nuevo Mundo, Reforma, Revolución francesa, Revolución bolchevique, Transformación tecnológica, Globalización – se ha ido transformando en el criterio normativo del mundo.

El proceso de modernización tiene dos caras, una exógena que no emerge de las necesidades de los pueblos y otra, endógena, que es un principio interno que no puede ser negado. La primera ha servido para la colonización y dominio de los pueblos, en tanto que la segundo surgió como una necesidad natural.

En cuanto a la globalización: representa el último punto de realización práctica de las pretensiones fundamentales de Occidente a la universabilidad de su experiencia histórica y de sus valores.

A la tesis de “Rusia, país europeo” va a oponer la tesis “Rusia-Eurasia como una civilización opuesta tanto Occidente como a Oriente”.

Apoyándose en la idea “gran espacio”(1939) de Carl Schmitt y teniendo como antecedente la Doctrina Monroe (1823) propone recuperar la idea de imperio.

Sostiene que la Doctrina Monroe nació como una idea anticolonialista y se fue transformando en una propuesta colonialista. Para nosotros, americanos del sur, tal Doctrina fue siempre colonialista cuyo enunciado real fue desde un comienzo: América para los norteamericanos.[1]

El concepto de imperio que se propone va más allá de los contextos históricos o políticos en que se haya dado y no se limita solo a una dimensión física ni a la presencia de un emperador. Eso si, el imperio exige un estricto centralismo administrativo y una amplia autonomía regional: El imperio es la mayor forma de humanidad y su mayor manifestación.

Cuando entre los imperios nombra el imperio comunista de la URSS y al imperio liberal de los EUA, y los pone a la misma altura que los imperios romano o autro-húngaro, Duguin no realiza la distinción entre imperio e imperialismo. Así, el imperio impone pero deja valores que le son propios (lengua, instituciones), mientras que el imperialismo es la imposición de un Estado sobre los otros para su explotación lisa y llana. El imperialismo deja solo desolación, en tanto que el imperio abre un mundo desconocido a sus dominados.

 

Un comentario especial merece su caracterización del conservadorismo, donde se ve la influencia de Alain de Benoist, seguramente el más original pensador francés vivo. El conservador no quiere conservar el pasado por ser pasado, según se lo define habitualmente, sino que pretende conservar del pasado lo constante, lo perenne. Y eso, porque no tiene una visión diacrónica de la historia sino sincrónica. El sentido del ser, de lo que es y existe no se apoya para él en la ideas de movimiento (pasado, presente, futuro) donde las cosas nos hacen un llamamiento desde el futuro bajo la idea de progreso, como sucede con el iluminismo, el modernismo y, hoy, el progresismo, sino que el sentido de las cosas hay que buscarlo en lo constante, en lo que permanece. El ser tiene una primacía sobre el tiempo; lo comanda y predetermina su estructura: el tiempo se da en el seno del ser como acontecimiento apropiador del ser.[2]

La conclusión política del conservadorismo ha dado lugar a la “cuarta teoría política”, pues así como en el siglo XX se dieron la primera teoría política con el liberalismo, la segunda con el marxismo, la tercera con el nazismo hoy, a comienzos del siglo XXI, hace su aparición la “cuarta teoría política” que hunde sus raíces en la revolución conservadora alemana del período entre guerras y que tuvo como exponentes, entre otros, a Moeller van der Bruck, Carl Schmitt, los hermanos Jünger, Martín Heidegger, von Solomon, von Papen, Werner Sombart, Stefan George que no se pudo plasmar en una práctica política concreta.

El imperio eurasiano propuesto por Duguin con Rusia como centro y cabeza que: debe pensar y obrar imperialmente, como un poder mundial que tenga opinión sobre todo hasta los lugares más distantes del planeta, tiene “carácter civilizatorio”  nos parece ambicioso, pero no inverosímil.

Nosotros creemos, y hemos intentado mostrar a través de múltiples trabajos, que las ideas de gran espacio y de imperio, en este caso, se unifican en la idea de “ecúmene”, que como la Hélade para los griegos, la romanitas para los romanos, o la hispanidad para los españoles, designan los grandes de tierra habitados por hombres que comparten entre sí, lengua, usos, costumbres, creencias y enemigos comunes. Y en este sentido sostenemos que el mundo es un pluriverso compuesto por varias ecúmenes entre las que se destaca, para nosotros, la iberoamericana.

Finalmente, toda la última parte del libro va ha estar ocupada en asuntos internos y temas casi exclusivamente rusos, de los que no nos encontramos capacitados para juzgar: la relación de Rusia con Ucrania, la filosofía del narod y su patriotismo erótico, el arcano roxo de Rusia, la estructura sociogenética de Rusia e intereses y valores post Tskhinvali.

Queremos felicitar a los traductores brasileños por este trabajo, que acerca al mundo luso e hispano hablante a un geopolitólogo de valía, prácticamente desconocido en nuestra común ecúmene cultural.

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[1]Cfr. El excelente trabajo del mejicano Carlos Fuentes: La doctrina Monroe

[2]Cfr. Martín Heidegger: Tiempo y ser(1962), que no hay que confundir con Ser y tiempo de 1927.

The Wise Counsellor

By Israel Shamir

 

Ex: http://www.granews.info

[A Review of The Fourth Political Theory, by Alexander Dugin. Arktos, London 2012]

Ideas do not flow easily westwards. It is a norm that Western ideas are being spread in the East, not vice versa. Russia, the heir to Byzantium, is an “East”, among other great “Easts” of Dar ul-Islam, China, India; of them, Russia is the nearest to the West, and still very different. This is probably the main reason why Dugin, this important contemporary Russian thinker makes his belated entrance into Western awareness only now.

Alexander Dugin, a youngish, stylish, slim, neat, hip and bearded don at the Moscow U, is a cult figure at his homeland; people throng to his lectures; his plentiful books cover a vast spectre of subjects from pop culture to metaphysics, from philosophy to theology, from international affairs to domestic politics. He is fluent in many languages, a voracious reader, and he made the Russians aware of many less known Western thinkers. He is ready to wade deepest waters of mystical and heterodox thought with mind-boggling courage. He thrives on controversies; adored and hated, but never boring.

He is a scholar and a practitioner of Mysticism, akin to Mirchea Eliade and Guenon; a church-going adherent of traditionalist Orthodoxy; an ardent student of conspiracy theories from Templers and the Holy Grail to Herman Wirth’s Arctogaia; he is a master of tools sharpened by Jean Baudrillard and Guy Debord; but first and foremost, he is a dedicated fighter for liberation of mankind from the vise of liberal tyranny in American-dominated New World Order, or even from Maya, the post-modernist post-liberal virtuality - by political means.

Like Alain Soral and Alain de Benoist, he considers the Left or Right dichotomy obsolete. What matters is Compliance with or Resistance to the New World Order. Dugin is all for Resistance. For this purpose, he cross-breeds political ideas like one cross-breeds ferocious fighting dogs. Faith, Tradition, Revolution, Nationalism and Communism are the ingredients. If Chavez were a nuke-armed Liberation Theology priest versed in Heidegger, it would be a near thing.

Dugin tried his hand in radical politics together with Eduard Limonov, the national-bolshevik poet, with Jamal Hyder, the Islam reformer; he was an ideologist for the Red-Browns, as an alliance of hardcore Communists and Nationalists in 1990’s Russia was called; now he is chaperoning a small Eurasian movement. 

But he is not a politician by nature: like Confucius, he’d prefer to be a wise councillor to the ruler. In that, he succeeded as little as Confucius. He outlined an ideology for Putin; Putin used his words but dismissed his thoughts. Dugin was very critical of Putin for his half-baked measures, but still he supported the President when Moscow Liberals began their Fronde. In his books, he offers a blueprint for a future development of his homeland. Bearing in mind his influence, it is important to learn; and even more so if we remember that the Russians once showed the way for mankind, even if this way was eventually deserted.

Intellectually curious, Dugin has checked every concept, every idea of the East and West, even the banned and forgotten ones, as long as it could serve the Resistance. He used Communist ideas as well as those of radical traditionalists for whom Hitler and Mussolini were not sufficiently radical. He weaves theology, politics and metaphysics into a single meta-narrative. His style is lucid and pleasant.

The Fourth Political Theory as published by Arktos bears the same title as one of Dugin’s recent and more important books, but it is quite a different book altogether; it would be aptly called Dugin Reader, or Essential Dugin. It was specially prepared for a Western English-speaking reader. A good thing, too: as one who writes in Russian and English I witness that a Russian political philosophical text can’t be rendered into English directly for political cultures are too far apart. As is, the book provides a good starting point for discovery of Dugin the political thinker.

The Fourth Political Theory of the book’s title stands against three most prominent paradigms (political theories) of last century, namely Liberalism, Marxism (including Communism and Socialism) and Fascism (including National Socialism). In a century-long struggle, liberalism defeated the other two, and claimed its kingdom is forever (“End of History”). The Fourth Theory (or rather, a paradigm) is proposed to overcome and bury it. Dugin does not present a ready-made Fourth Theory to supplant the three, but rather points out some directions for its creation and practical implementation. This new theory should not explain the world, but change it. It should inspire a Crusade against West-centered liberalism, like the WW2 was a Crusade against Nazism. In other words, it is not so much a theory, rather a fighting doctrine, a call to rebuild our world.

‘The enemy is more important than friend, choose him carefully for this choice will influence your decisions”, said Dugin’s mentor Carl Schmitt. Dugin’s enemy No. 1 is Liberalism, in his view, a form of social Darwinism for the richest to survive and flourish, while the rest suffer and die spiritually and physically.

Liberalism is the greatest Evil of our days by virtue of its unavoidability, its choiceless imposition since 1990s; it is the dead end and Destiny to be defied, according to Dugin. Liberalism and its “freedom of” leads to disintegration of society; it “frees” man of family, of state, of gender, and even of his humanity. Liberalism will eventually lead to supplantation of man by genetically modified cyborgs, says Dugin.

The Fourth Paradigm should incorporate the best features of its three predecessors and reject their faults. Thus, Marxism’s tenet of historical materialism or belief in inevitability of progress, economism or belief in primacy of economics, its anti-spirituality and anti-ethnicity should be rejected, while its critique of capitalism should be retained, as well as the founding myth of return to the Lost Paradise of creative labour.

Dugin is ready to consider good points of Fascism and National Socialism, and for this reason he is sometimes branded “Nazi” by unfair critics, a misnomer, for he is definitely non-racist. In this book he preaches against racism, not only against rude biological racism of the Third Reich, but against racist unipolar civilisation, racist glamour and fashion, cultural racism, even of racist exclusion of political correctness. By expurgating racist component of National Socialism, this political theory is rendered “safe” and its positive aspects may be considered, he says. Such a positive aspect is love of people, of volk, an erotic love of men and women constituting people, ethnocentrism, acceptance of “ethnos in its environment” as a subject of history.

Though the Fourth Theory is brandished as a weapon against liberalism, some positive aspects could be taken even there. Dugin approves of freedom while rejecting individualism. Human freedom - yes, he says, individual freedom - no. He submits the concept of individual rights to scathing critique: liberalism approves of individual rights because they are puny; these are rights of a small man. Human freedom is freedom for a great man, for people, and it should be unlimited, he says.

Dugin thrives to cure faults of Communism and National Socialism, perhaps cross-breed these theories, aiming somewhere between anti-Hitlerites Strasser brothers and Ernst Niekisch on one side, and National Communists on the other side. This meeting ground of yesterday’s Far Left and Far Right should be fertilised by Myth and Tradition, desecularised, and Dasein-centered, at first.

Still, there are features of all three predecessors that are not acceptable for Dugin, and first of all belief in progress and linear development. A flyball governor, a device that prevents a steam engine’s blow up by cutting down fuel supply as it steams up, is the thing mankind needs for its endeavours. Instead of a monotonic process, there should be circular, cyclic process, what others would call a sustainable development.

Dugin intends to cure a deep ontological problem of alienation and denial of Being, in terms of Martin Heidegger, who said that the ancient Greeks confused Being-in-itself (Sein) and the human experience of Being-in-the-world (Dasein), and this small confusion, in fullness of time, caused technical progress and ushered in Nothingness. This is what Dugin wants to overcome by bringing forth Being-in-the-world as the most admirable actor of history. For liberals, the most important is Individual, for Communists it is a social Class, for Nazis it was a Race, for Fascists – a State, and for Dugin and his Fourth Paradigm – Being-in-the-world. Thus the deep night of alienation can be turned into a bright day of Being, says Dugin.

If Communist and National Socialist philosophies were based on Hegel, philosophy of Dugin as well as that of Dugin’s enemies, neocon liberals of Leo Strauss, is based on Heidegger. A contemporary wit described Stalingrad battle thus: “Leftist Hegelians fight Rightist Hegelians”. Perhaps we shall see People’s Heideggerians fighting against Elitist Heideggerians? …

Some of Dugin’s geopolitical thoughts are included in the book. He is an enemy of globalisation, and seeks independent life and development for big regions: Europe, North America, Russia, China etc. He thinks it is important to release Europe from the American yoke. Let America be free to live the way she likes beyond the ocean, but she should desist from interfering overseas and from forcing its way of life upon others.

As for Russia, he sees his homeland as a possible base of resistance to the NWO, together with other countries that defy the US diktat. He does not think today’s Russia is ready for the great challenge, it is evasive and of two minds; still this is the best we have. Its nuclear shield may defend the first saplings of new ideas from the rough justice of the world sheriff.

The Fourth Political Theory is a good beginning in delivering Dugin’s ideas to the Western reader. After all, even Heidegger’s rejection of Western nihilism is also a Western idea.

John Morgan: The Fourth Political Theory

The Fourth Political Theory

An interview with John Morgan

Natella Speranskaya:  How did you discover the Fourth Political Theory? And how would you evaluate its chances of becoming a major ideology of the 21st century?

JM:  I have been interested in the work of Prof. Dugin since I first discovered English translations of his writings at the Arctogaia Web sites in the late 1990s. So I had already heard of the Fourth Political Theory even before my publishing house, Arktos, agreed to publish his book of the same name. In editing the translation of the book, I became intimately familiar with Prof. Dugin’s concept. According to him, the Fourth Political Theory is more of a question than an ideology at this point. It is easier to identify what it is not, which is opposed to everything represented by liberalism, and which will transcend the failures of Marxism and fascism. In recent decades, many people have been heralding the “death of ideology.” Carl Schmitt predicted this, saying that the last battle would take place between those who wish to reject the role of politics in civilization, and those who understand the need for it. The death of ideology, I believe, is simply the exhaustion of those political systems that are founded on liberalism. This does not mean that politics itself has ended, but only that a new system is required. The Fourth Political Theory offers the best chance to take what is best from the old ideologies and combine them with new ideas, to create the new vision that will carry humanity into the next age. Although we can’t say with certainty what that will look like, as of yet. But it should be obvious to everyone that the current ideology has already run its course.

NS:  Leo Strauss when commenting on the fundamental work of Carl Schmitt The Concept of the Political notes that despite all radical critique of liberalism incorporated in it Schmitt does not follow it through since his critique remains within the scope of liberalism”. “His anti-Liberal tendencies, – claims Strauss, - remain constrained by “systematics of liberal thought” that has not been overcome so far, which – as Schmitt himself admits – “despite all failures cannot be substituted by any other system in today’s Europe. What would you identify as a solution to the problem of overcoming the liberal discourse? Could you consider the Fourth Political Theory by Alexander Dugin to be such a solution? The theory that is beyond the three major ideologies of the 20th century – Liberalism, Communism and Fascism, and that is against the Liberal doctrine.

JM:  Yes, definitely. The unsustainably and intellectual poverty of liberalism in Europe, and also America, is becoming more apparent with each passing day. Clearly a new solution is needed. Prof. Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory, as he has explained in his book of the same title, is more of a question than an ideology at this point, and it is up to those of us who are attempting to defy unipolar hegemony to determine what it will be. So, yes, we need a new ideology, even if we cannot yet explain exactly what it will be in practice. I think Prof. Dugin’s idea of taking Heidegger’s Dasein as our watchword is a good one, because we are so entrenched in the liberal mindset – even those of us who want to overcome it – that it is only be re-engaging with the pure essence of the reality of the world around us that we will find a way out of it. The representational, virtual reality of postmodernism which surrounds most of us on a daily basis has conditioned us to only think about liberalism on its own terms. Only by renewing our contact with the real, non-representational world, and by disregarding all previous concepts and labels, can we find the seeds for a new way of apprehending it.

NS:  Do you agree that today there are “two Europes”: the one – the liberal one (incorporating the idea of “open society”, human rights, registration of same-sex marriages, etc.) and the other Europe (“a different Europe”) – politically engaged, thinker, intellectual, spiritual, the one that considers the status quo and domination of liberal discourse as a real disaster and the betrayal of the European tradition. How would you evaluate chances of victory of a “different Europe” over the ”first” one?

JM:  Speaking as an American outsider, I absolutely see two Europes. The surface Europe is one that has turned itself into a facsimile of America – the free market, democracy, multiculturalism, secularism, pop culture, sacrificing genuine identity for fashions, and so on. The other Europe is much more difficult to see, but I have the good fortune of having many friends who dwell within it. This is the undercurrent that has refused to accept the Americanization of Europe, and which also rejects the liberal hegemony in all its forms. They remain true to the ancient spirit of Europe’s various peoples and cultures, while also dreaming of a new Europe that will be strong, independent and creative once again. We see this in the New Right, in the identitarian movement, and in the many nationalist groups across Europe that have sprung up in recent years. As of now, their influence is small, but as the global situation gets worse, I believe they will gain the upper hand, as more Europeans will become open to the idea of finding new solutions and new ways of living, disassociated from the collapsing hegemonic order. So I estimate their chances as being very good. Although they must begin acting now, even before the “collapse,” if they are to rescue their identities from oblivion, since the “real” Europe is fast being driven out of existence by the forces of liberalism.

NS:  “There is nothing more tragic than a failure to understand the historical moment we are currently going through; - notes Alain de Benoist – this is the moment of postmodern globalization”. The French philosopher emphasizes the significance of the issue of a new Nomos of the Earth or a way of establishing international relations. What do you think the fourth Nomos will be like? Would you agree that the new Nomos is going to be Eurasian and multipolar (transition from universum to pluriversum)?

JM:  Yes, I do agree. In terms of what it will look like, see my answer to question 4 in the first set of questions.

NS:  Do you agree that the era of the white European human race has ended, and the future will be predetermined by Asian cultures and societies?

JM:  If you mean the era of the domination of White Europeans (although of course that comprises many diverse and unique identities in itself), and those of European descent such as in America, over the entire world, then yes, that era is coming to an end, and has been, gradually, since the First World War. As for the fate of White Europeans in our own homelands, that is also an open question, given the lack of genuine culture and diminishing reproductive rates of Whites around the world, coupled with large-scale non-White immigration into our homelands. While I welcome the end of White hegemony, which overall hasn’t been good for anyone, most especially for Whites themselves, as an American of European descent I do fear the changes that are taking place in our lands. As the thinkers of the “New Right” such as Alain de Benoist have said, if we stand for the preservation of the distinct identities of all peoples and cultures, then we must also defend the identities of the various European peoples and their offshoots. I would like to see European peoples, including in America, develop the will to resist this onslaught and re-establish our lands as the true cradles of our cultures and identities. Of course, in order to do this, White peoples must first get their souls back and return to their true cultures, rejecting multiculturalism and the corporate consumer culture that has grown up in tandem with neo-colonialism, both of which victimize Whites just as much as non-Whites. Unfortunately, few White Europeans around the world have come to this understanding thus far, but I hope that will change.

As for whether the future belongs to Asians, that I cannot say. Certainly India and China are among the most prominent rising powers. But at the same time, they face huge domestic challenges, demographically and otherwise. Whether they will be able to sustain the momentum they have now is uncertain. Having lived in India for the last four years, while it is a land I have come to love, I have difficulty seeing India emerging as a superpower anytime soon. The foundations just aren’t there yet.  Likewise, I find it troubling that India and China continue to understand “progress” in terms of how closely they mimic the American lifestyle and its values. Until Asian (and other) nations can find a way to develop a sustainable and stable social order, and until they forge a new and unique identity for themselves in keeping with their traditions that is disconnected from the Western model, I don’t see them overtaking the so-called “First World.”

NS:  Do you consider Russia to be a part of Europe or do you accept the view that Russia and Europe represent two different civilizations?

JM:  As a longtime student of Dostoevsky, I have always believed that Russia is a unique civilization in its own right. Although clearly Russia shares cultural affinities and linkages with Europe that cannot be denied, and which bring it closer to Europe than to Asia, it retains a character that is purely its own. I have always admired this aspect of Russia. Whereas Western Europe sold its soul in the name of material prosperity in its rush to embrace the supposed benefits of the Industrial Revolution and modernity as quickly as possible, Russia developed its own unique path to modernity, and has always fought hard to maintain its independence. It seems to me, as a foreigner, that as a result, Russia retains a much stronger connection to the spiritual and the intangible aspects of life than in the West, as well as a more diverse, as opposed to purely utilitarian, outlook. The German Conservative Revolutionaries understood this, which is why they sought to tilt Germany more towards Russia politically and culturally, and away from England and the United States (such as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck advocated). Similarly, in today’s world, New Rightists, traditionalists and so forth would do well to look toward Russia and its traditions for inspiration. 

NS:  Contemporary ideologies are based on the principle of secularity. Would you predict the return of religion, the return of sacrality? If so, in what form? Do you consider it to be Islam, Christianity, Paganism or any other forms of religion?

JM:  I think we already see this happening to an extent. In the nineteenth and for most of the twentieth century, the prevailing view was skepticism and scientism, with religion primarily relegated to its moralistic aspects. But beginning in the 1960s in North America and Western Europe, we have seen a renewal of interest in religion and the transcendental view of life on a large scale. This development was, of course, presaged by the traditionalist philosophers, such as René Guénon and Julius Evola, who understood modernity perhaps better than any other Europeans of their time. But unfortunately, this revival in practice has tended toward New Age modes of thought, or else mere identity politics and exotericism as we see with the rise of fundamentalist Christianity in America, rather than in genuinely traditional spirituality. As such, most spirituality in the Western nations today is an outgrowth of modernity, rather than something that can be used to oppose and transcend it. But the fact that more traditionalist books are being made available, and that we see more groups dedicated to traditional spirituality and esotericism than ever before, is a promising trend.

As for the form that this revival will ultimately take, that depends on the location. For much of the world, of course, people are likely to return to and revitalize the traditions that grew out of their own civilizations, which is as it should be. We already see efforts in this direction at work in some parts of the so-called “Third World.” But in Western Europe, and especially America, it is a more difficult question. The Catholic Church today doesn’t hold much promise for those of a traditional mindset. Guénon himself abandoned his native Catholicism and began to practice Islam because he had come to believe that Catholicism was no longer a useful vehicle for Tradition. And of course today, things are much worse than they were in Guénon’s time. Protestantism, besides being counter-traditional, is in even poorer shape these days. And while I am very sympathetic to those who are seeking to revive the pre-Christian traditions of Europe, or adopt traditions from other cultures, this ultimately isn’t a good strategy for those who are engaged in sociopolitical activity alongside spiritual activities. The vast majority of Europeans and Americans still identify with Christianity in some form, and this will need to be taken into account by any new political or metapolitical movement that emerges there.

In America, unlike Europe, we have no real tradition of our own. This is both a blessing and a curse. It’s a blessing because our culture has always been tolerant of allowing and even embracing the presence of alternative forms of spirituality. (Interest in Hinduism, for example, began in America already in the Nineteenth century with such figures as Thoreau and Emerson, and with the arrival of Hindu teachers from India such as Protap Chunder Mozoomdar and Swami Vivekananda.) But it is also a curse because there is no particular, universal spiritual tradition that underlies American civilization which can be revived. Christianity remains dominant, but certainly the popular forms of it that exist in America today are unacceptable from a traditional standpoint. At the same time, most Americans are unlikely to accept any form of spirituality which they perceive to be different from or in opposition to Christianity. So it is a difficult question.

The best solution may be to exclude advocating any specific religion from our efforts in the West for the time being, and leave such decisions to the individual. Of course, we should encourage everyone who supports us to integrate the traditional worldview into their own lives, in whatever form that may take, and to oppose secularism on the grounds of the resacralization of culture. Perhaps once the process of the collapse of the current global and cultural order is further along, and as the peoples’ faith in the illusions of progress, materialism and nationalism inculcated by modernity are shattered, the new form or forms of religion that must take root in the West will become more readily apparent.

 

Grossraum: International Conference of Global Revolutionary Alliance

La Russie aux temps postmodernes

La Russie aux temps postmodernes

par Georges FELTIN-TRACOL

 

Penseur néo-eurasiste influencé par les œuvres de René Guénon et de Julius Evola, polyglotte émérite à l’insatiable curiosité, Alexandre Douguine incarne pleinement ce que le communiste italien Antonio Gramsci qualifiait d’« intellectuel organique ». L’auteur d’une abondante bibliographie qui va de la géopolitique à l’étude sociologique des musiques contemporaines vient de publier la traduction française de sa Quatrième théorie. Il faut en saluer la parution tant ses écrits demeurent rares et méconnus dans le monde francophone. La sortie de cet essai est un grand événement éditorial !

 

Lecteur attentif d’Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, de Claude Lévi-Strauss, de Georges Sorel, Alexandre Douguine s’est aussi inspiré des travaux de Martin Heidegger, Francis Fukuyama, Carl Schmitt, Gilles Deleuze ou Guy Debord.

 

Pragmatique partant d’un constat accablant, le fondateur du Mouvement international eurasien se demande : « Comment faire de la politique quand il n’y a pas de politique ? Il n’existe qu’une seule solution : refuser les théories politiques classiques, tant vaincues que triomphantes, et faire preuve d’imagination, saisir les réalités du nouveau monde global, déchiffrer correctement les défis du monde postmoderne et créer quelque chose de nouveau, au-delà des affrontements politiques des XIXe et XXe siècles (p. 12). » Prenant par conséquent acte de la victoire de la pensée libérale qu’il appelle “ Première théorie ” et des échecs du communisme, « Deuxième théorie », et du « fascisme » (au sens très large du mot), « Troisième théorie », Alexandre Douguine esquisse une « Quatrième théorie politique » « non pas comme un travail ou une saga d’auteur, mais comme la direction d’un large spectre d’idées, d’études, d’analyses, de prévisions et de projets. Tout individu pensant dans cette optique peut y apporter quelque chose de soi (p. 13) ».

 

Cela fait très longtemps qu’Alexandre Douguine était en quête d’une nouvelle solution politique. Dès 1994, il en exposait les prémices théoriques dans un entretien passé inaperçu paru dans le n° 119 nouvelle série du magazine Le Crapouillot (mai – juin 1994), intitulé « Créer l’Europe des ethnies (pp. 9 – 13) ». Estimant que « le temps de la gauche anti-capitaliste est définitivement passé (art. cit., p. 9) », Douguine prévoyait l’entrée « dans l’ère de la droite anti-capitaliste – donc nationaliste, identitaire, différencialiste et organiciste (art. cit., p. 9) ». Il ajoutait plus loin que « nous sommes en présence de la naissance de la nouvelle idéologie anti-libérale, qui unira, en son sein, trois tendances politiques collectivistes, à savoir : le nationalisme, le socialisme et la démocratie, en opposition à la tendance libérale qui est essentiellement individualiste (art. cit., p. 12) ».

 

Contre le libéralisme postmoderne

 

Une nouvelle vision du monde s’impose, car le début du XXIe siècle marque l’achèvement de l’ère moderne ainsi que l’obsolescence de ses trois grandes théories mobilisatrices au profit d’une fluidité croissante et d’une mutation majeure de la doctrine libérale elle-même. Ce changement s’opère néanmoins dans un monde saturé d’idées libérales qui, du fait de leur réussite même, engendrent un « post-libéralisme » ou un « libéralisme 2.0 », promoteur d’une « société de marché globale (p. 21) ». C’est parce que « le libéralisme, mettant toujours l’accent sur la minimalisation du politique, a décidé, après sa victoire, de supprimer de façon générale la politique (p. 11) » que « le monde global doit être dirigé seulement par les lois économiques et la morale universelle des “ droits de l’homme ”. Toutes les décisions politiques sont remplacées par des techniques (p. 21) ». Ce « post-libéralisme » commence même à modifier la nature humaine. Douguine désigne donc clairement « le libéralisme et ses métamorphoses (p. 37) » postmodernistes (terme à préférer à celui de « post-moderne ») comme l’ennemi principal à abattre. Émanation des Lumières, « l’individualisme est devenu le sujet normatif à l’échelle de toute l’humanité. Apparaît alors le phénomène de la mondialisation, et le modèle de la société post-industrielle commence à se manifester, l’époque du postmoderne commence. Désormais, le sujet individuel n’apparaît plus comme le résultat d’un choix mais comme une certaine donnée générale obligatoire. La personne est libérée de  “ l’appartenance ”, l’idéologie “ des droits de l’homme ” devient communément acceptée (du moins – en théorie) et, dans les faits, obligatoire. L’humanité, composée d’individus, tend naturellement vers l’universalité, devient globale et unifiée. Ainsi naît le projet d’« État mondial » et de “ gouvernement mondial ” (le globalisme) (p. 20) ». Ses méfaits, réels, insidieux et profonds, dévastent tout autant les milieux naturels pollués que les psychismes. Il relève que « la logique du libéralisme mondial et de la mondialisation nous tire vers l’abîme de la dissolution postmoderniste dans la virtualité. Notre jeunesse a déjà un pied dans cet abîme : les codes du globalisme libéral s’introduisent de plus en plus efficacement au niveau de l’inconscient, dans les habitudes, la publicité, le glamour, les technologies, les modèles de réseau. La perte de l’identité, non seulement nationale ou culturelle mais aussi sexuelle et bientôt humaine, est désormais chose commune. Et les défenseurs des droits de l’homme, sans remarquer la tragédie de peuples entiers sacrifiés selon les plans cruels du “ nouvel ordre mondial ”, hurleront demain à la violation des droits des cyborgs ou des clones (p. 54) ». L’égalitarisme prôné par le « libéralisme 2.0 » est l’ultime réductionnisme de l’Occident globalitaire anomique.

 

Ce dispositif total, néo-totalitaire, de nivellement général bénéficie d’un redoutable modèle attractif : les États-Unis d’Amérique. Fille de la Modernité et matrice d’un postmodernisme « ultra-moderne », « l’Amérique prétend désormais à une diffusion universelle d’un code unitaire, qui pénètre dans la vie des peuples et des États par des milliers de voies différentes – comme le réseau global – à travers la technologie, l’économie de marché, le modèle politique de la démocratie libérale, les systèmes d’information, les clichés de la culture de masse, l’établissement du contrôle stratégique direct des Américains et de leurs satellites sur les processus géopolitiques (p. 47) ».

 

Décomposition des droites et des gauches

 

Contre cette « Hydre de Lerne » postmoderniste, un regard critique sur l’histoire des idées politiques est indispensable afin de concevoir une théorie novatrice. Alexandre Douguine prévient qu’elle « ne peut être une tâche individuelle pas plus que celle d’un petit cercle d’individus. L’effort doit être synodique, collectif. Les représentants d’autres cultures et d’autres peuples (d’Europe, ainsi que d’Asie), qui se rendent compte également de façon aiguë de la tension eschatologique du moment présent (p. 32) ». On y décèle ici la double influence de l’« impersonnalité active » chère à Evola et du sobornost de l’Orthodoxie. Il espère que la Quatrième théorie politique sera « une alternative au post-libéralisme, non pas comme une position par rapport à une autre, mais comme idée opposée à la matière; comme un possible entrant en conflit avec le réel; comme un réel n’existant pas mais attaquant déjà le réel (p. 22) ».

 

À cette fin, il devient utile de dresser la généalogie et la taxinomie des idées politiques modernes. L’anti-conformisme de la démarche de Douguine est déjà ancienne puisque cela fait longtemps qu’il propose de comprendre les auteurs de l’ultra-gauche d’un œil révolutionnaire-conservateur et de commenter les penseurs de l’« extrême droite » à l’aune de Marx, de Toni Negri et d’autres théoriciens gauchistes. Tout en reprenant la distinction classique entre la « droite » et la « gauche », Douguine dynamite en réalité cette dichotomie familière en discernant trois idéologies de « gauche » : les « vieilles gauches » avec les marxistes, les sociaux-démocrates et les zélateurs travaillistes d’une pseudo-« troisième voie » du Britannique Giddens, gourou de Tony Blair; les « nouvelles gauches » qui rassemblent sous ce label les néo-gauchistes, les altermondialistes et les postmodernistes genre Negri; et les « nationalistes de gauche », à savoir les tendances nationales-bolcheviques, nationales-communistes et « nationales-gauchistes ». Quant à la « droite » que Douguine préfère nommer « conservatisme » parce que c’« est un “ non ” adressé à ce qui est autour. Et au nom de quoi ? Au nom de ce qui était avant (p. 86) », il distingue :

 

— le conservatisme fondamental où l’on retrouve les écoles de la Tradition et les monothéismes dits « intégristes », y compris un certain islamisme;

 

— le libéral-conservatisme qui « dit “ oui ” à la tendance principale qui se réalise dans la modernité mais s’efforce de freiner à chaque nouvelle étape de la réalisation de ces tendances (p. 92) »;

 

— les forces conservatrices-révolutionnaires qui « ne veulent pas seulement geler le temps à la différence des libéraux-conservateurs ou encore revenir dans le passé (comme les traditionalistes) mais arracher à la structure de ce monde les racines du mal et annihiler le temps en tant que propriété destructrice de la réalité, réalisant le dessein secret, parallèle et insoupçonné de la Divinité elle-même (p. 97) ».

 

Douguine analyse finement l’approche contre-révolutionnaire (Maistre, Bonald, etc.) pour qui « le postmoderne avec sa dérision suive son cours, qu’il dissolve les paradigmes déterminés, l’ego, le super-ego, le logos, que le rhizome et les masses schizophréniques ainsi que la conscience morcelée entrent en jeu et que le néant entraîne derrière lui tant le contenu du monde, alors s’ouvriront des portes secrètes et les archétypes ontologiques anciens, éternels, apparaîtront à la surface et de façon terrible mettront fin au jeu (pp. 99 – 100) ».

 

Après avoir déterminé idéalement ces tendances politiques, Alexandre Douguine les recherche sur la scène politique russe avec d’inévitables mélanges contextuels. Le Parti communiste de la Fédération de Russie de Guennadi Ziouganov est sans conteste national-communiste alors que le mouvement Rodina (« Patrie ») fut inconsciemment national-gauchiste. Si l’opposition à Vladimir Poutine, malgré Limonov, verse plus ou moins dans le libéralisme et l’occidentalisme, Russie unie défend une conception sociale-conservatrice. Enfin, son eurasisme radical puise à la fois dans la Tradition et dans la Révolution conservatrice. Mais toutes les formations politiques russes communient dans un ardent patriotisme, ce que ne comprennent pas les observateurs occidentaux…

 

Il ne fait guère de doute que l’eurasisme constitue, aux yeux d’Alexandre Douguine, le cœur de la Quatrième théorie politique. Discutant des thèses culturalistes du « choc des civilisations » de Samuel Huntington, il dénie à la Russie tout caractère européen. Par sa situation géographique, son histoire et sa spiritualité, « la Russie constitue une civilisation à part entière (p. 167) ». Déjà dans son histoire, « la Russie – Eurasie (civilisation particulière) possédait tant ses propres valeurs distinctes que ses propres intérêts. Ces valeurs se rapportaient à la société traditionnelle avec une importance particulière de la foi orthodoxe et un messianisme russe spécifique (p. 146) ». Et quand il aborde la question de la Russie et de son peuple-noyau, les Russes issus des Slaves orientaux, Alexandre Douguine déclare son amour à son peuple et à sa terre. « Peuple du vent et du feu, de l’odeur du foin et des nuits bleu sombre transpercées par les gouffres des étoiles, un peuple portant Dieu dans ses entrailles, tendre comme le pain et le lait, souple comme un magique et musculeux poisson de rivière lavé par les vagues (p. 302) », les Russes incarnent un peuple tellurique.

 

Un conservatisme rénové

 

Via l’eurasisme s’élabore une nouvelle approche du conservatisme, un conservatisme repensé, révolutionnaire et adapté à la phase post-moderne des temps. Alexandre Douguine affirme que « le conservateur aime ce qui est grand et dans l’homme, il aime ce qui est grand et élevé (p. 111) ». Il est logique que « le conservatisme, défendant l’éternité, défend également l’éternité de l’homme, de l’homme en tant que structure douée de signes intangibles et d’une vie inaliénable. L’Homme est un concept conservateur (p. 110) ». La modernité libérale et le postmodernisme post-libéral nient au contraire l’homme singulier pour mieux valoriser un homme abstrait doté de droits fallacieux ou extravagants (voir la dernière lubie lyssenkiste en date avec la pseudo-théorie du genre).

 

« Pluralisme gnoséologique, [… l’eurasisme est] une forme spécifique de conservatisme, qui se différencie des autres versions de conservatisme proches (à la différence du libéral-conservatisme), par le fait qu’elle trouve une alternative au moderne non pas dans le passé, ou dans un renversement conservateur révolutionnaire exceptionnel, mais dans les sociétés cœxistant avec la civilisation occidentale mais géographiqement et culturellement distinctes d’elle (p. 101). » Fort de ce constat, Douguine se permet de « déconstruire » la démocratie dans sa pratique libérale hypocrite. Il remarque d’abord que « le principe de prise de décisions collectives constitue le fondement de la démocratie (p. 58) » et que « la démocratie constitue la forme d’organisation politique la plus ancienne, la plus archaïque, la plus primitive et, si l’on veut, la plus barbare (p. 57) ». Ne craignant pas de se mettre à dos les belles âmes occidentalocentrées, il assène que « la démocratie ne reconnaît aucunement l’égalité des individus. Elle comporte une limite très stricte qui sépare ceux qui ont le droit de participer à l’extase politique de la décision de ceux qui ne le peuvent pas (p. 58) ». L’octroi du droit de vote aux étrangers va à l’encontre de cette stricte différenciation et favorise plutôt « la tyrannie [qui] remplace la démocratie en tant que forme d’organisation politique plus contemporaine où pour la première fois se manifeste très clairement un individu distinct, dans notre cas le tyran (pp. 59 – 60) ».

 

L’émergence d’une nouvelle figure tyrannique résulte de l’occidentalisation du monde. « Puisque modernisation et occidentalisation constituent des synonymes (Occident = moderne), il est impossible de mener une modernisation séparée de l’Occident et de ne pas copier ses valeurs (pp. 127 – 128). » Pis, « la fosse noire et vide de sens du postmoderne réalisé brille au centre de l’Occident global, les États-Unis et les pays de l’Alliance transatlantique (p. 138) ». Or, « pour combler le vide, la Russie a besoin d’une nouvelle idée politique. Le libéralisme ne convient pas, tandis que le communisme et le fascisme sont inacceptables (p. 13) ». Dès lors, « seule une croisade mondiale contre les États-Unis, l’Occident, la mondialisation et leur expression politico-idéologique, le libéralisme, peut constituer une réponse adéquate (p. 55) », d’où l’importance d’une Quatrième théorie politique particulièrement adaptée à la Russie.

 

« La lutte contre la métamorphose postmoderniste du libéralisme en postmoderne et un globalisme doit être qualitativement autre, se fonder sur des principes nouveaux et proposer de nouvelles stratégies (p. 22). » C’est le but tactique de l’eurasisme et de la Quatrième théorie politique. Contre le « nomadisme de l’asphalte (p. 258) » célébré par les médiats occidentaux globalitaires ultra-individualistes et ochlocratiques, Alexandre Douguine, en chrétien orthodoxe vieux-croyant conséquent, désigne l’atlantisme, « mal absolu (p. 258) », comme l’hérésie contemporaine contre laquelle le combat doit être implacable. « Pour les eurasistes, le moderne est un phénomène spécifique à l’Occident tandis que les autres cultures doivent démasquer les prétentions à l’université de la civilisation occidentale et construire leur société sur leurs valeurs internes (p. 101). »

 

De l’empire au grand espace

 

Guidé par les travaux de Johann Gottfried von Herder, Friedrich Ratzel, Jean Parvulesco et Raymond Abellio, Alexandre Douguine veut que « l’eurasisme se positionne fermement non pas en faveur de l’universalisme, mais en faveur des “ grands espaces ”, non pas en faveur de l’impérialisme, mais pour les “ empires ”, non pas en faveur des intérêts d’un seul pays, mais en faveur des “ droits des peuples ” (p. 207) ». Dans un monde enfin multipolaire, chaque pôle d’influence mondiale s’édifiera autour d’un grand espace géo-culturel particulier.

 

Homme de Tradition qui se réfère à l’ethnosociologie, à la géopolitique et à la théologie, Alexandre Douguine se défie des concepts d’État et de nation. Si le premier, malgré sa froideur intrinsèque, reste pour lui nécessaire, le second ne correspond pas à l’esprit des steppes eurasiennes. Mais sa critique ne coïncide pas avec celle des libéraux. En effet, pour un libéral, « la “ nation ” désignait l’ensemble des citoyens de l’État, dans lequel s’incarne le contact des individus qui le peuplent, unis par un territoire de résidence commun, ainsi que par un même niveau de développement de l’activité économique (p. 41) ». Quant à l’État-nation, il « représentait une sorte de “ corporation ” ou d’entreprise, créée selon l’accord mutuel de ses participants et qui peut être théoriquement dissoute pour les mêmes raisons (p. 42) ». Or, répondant aux discours tenus par des « nationaux-souverainistes » russes, Douguine affirme que le destin de la Russie n’est pas de devenir une nation, mais de rester un empire. « Entre l’Empire et le “ grand homme ” (homo maximus), il existe une homologie directe. L’Empire est la société maximale, l’échelle maximale possible de l’Empire. L’Empire incarne la fusion entre le ciel et la terre, la combinaison des différences en une unité, différences qui s’intègrent dans une matrice stratégique commune. L’Empire est la plus haute forme de l’humanité, sa plus haute manifestation. Il n’est rien de plus humain que l’Empire (p. 111). » « L’empire constitue une organisation politique territoriale qui combine à la fois une très forte centralisation stratégique (une verticale du pouvoir unique, un modèle centralisé de commandement des forces armées, la présence d’un code juridique civil commun à tous, un système unique de collecte des impôts, un système unique de communication, etc.) avec une large autonomie des formations sociopolitiques régionales, entrant dans la composition de l’empire (la présence d’éléments de droit ethno-confessionnel au niveau local, une composition plurinationale, un système largement développé d’auto-administration locale, la possibilité de cœxistence de différents modèles de pouvoir locaux, de la démocratie tribale aux principautés centralisées, voire aux royaumes) (pp. 210 – 211). »

 

L’idée d’empire est plus que jamais d’actualité dans les faits, car, si l’Union européenne demeure un « empire hésitant (p. 218) », Alexandre Douguine souligne avec raison que les élites étatsuniennes raisonnent, elles, dans ces termes avec le Benevolent empire. Idem chez les islamistes qui rêvent, eux, d’un califat universel et dont « le projet islamique en tant que réponse à la mondialisation américaine coïncide pleinement avec la définition de l’empire. […] Il s’agit d’un projet d’empire mondial alternatif (pp. 217 – 218) ».

 

L’empire correspond de nos jours à la notion géopolitique de civilisation. « La mise en évidence de la civilisation en qualité de sujet de la politique mondiale au XXIe siècle permettra de mener une “ globalisation régionale ”, une unification des pays et des peuples qui se rapportent à une seule et même civilisation (p. 187). » En clair, faire des civilisations des « grands espaces ». Théorisé par Carl Schmitt, l’un des plus grands penseurs du XXe siècle, « le “ grand espace ” ne constitue qu’une autre dénomination de ce que nous comprenons sous le terme de civilisation dans son sens géopolitique, spatial et culturel. Un “ grand espace ” se distingue des États-nations existant aujourd’hui précisément en ceci qu’il se construit sur le fondement d’un système de valeurs et d’une parenté historique, ainsi que par le fait qu’il unit plusieurs, voire un grand nombre d’États différents liés par une “ communauté de destin ”. Dans différents grands espaces, le facteur d’intégration peut varier : dans un cas, la religion peut jouer ce rôle, dans un autre, l’origine ethnique, la forme culturelle, le type sociopolitique ou la situation géographique (p. 188) ».

 

Arme géopolitique anti-mondialiste par excellence, « le “ grand espace ” découle d’une stratégie anticoloniale et présuppose (d’un point de vue purement théorique) une alliance volontaire de tous les pays du continent s’efforçant d’affirmer collectivement leur indépendance (p. 194) ». Ainsi peut-on soutenir, concernant la politogenèse européenne, que « les continentalistes affirment que les États-Unis et l’Europe ont non seulement des intérêts divergents, mais également des valeurs divergentes (p. 140) » parce qu’avec les grands espaces civilisationnels, « il n’y aura aucun étalon universel, ni matériel, ni spirituel. Chaque civilisation recevra enfin le droit de proclamer librement ce qui constitue pour elle la mesure des choses. Ici, ce sera l’homme, là, la religion, ailleurs, l’éthique, ailleurs enfin, la matière (p. 191) ». Si l’Union européenne paraît dans l’impossibilité de former un grand espace impérial conscient de son destin, Douguine appelle cependant les Européens à ne pas céder au fatalisme et au pessimisme. Certes, « aujourd’hui l’axe Paris – Berlin – Moscou apparaît plus que jamais fantomatique mais […] de ces mêmes fantômes naissent parfois de grands phénomènes (pp. 229 – 230) ». Il souhaite en revanche que la C.E.I. (Communauté des États indépendants) et les autres organisations de coopération comme l’Organisation du traité de sécurité collective (O.T.S.C.), la Communauté économique eurasiatique (C.E.E.), l’Organisation de coopération centre-asiatique (O.C.C.E.) et l’Union de la Russie et du Bélarus jettent les bases solides de « l’empire eurasiste du futur (p. 223) » capable d’affronter l’Occident financiariste et mondialiste.

 

Dans cette lutte à venir (mais qui a dès à présent commencé avec les actions médiatiques des bandes pétassières des Pussy Riots et des FemHaine ou les attaques anti-russes des cloportes du Congrès étatsunien), la Russie est à l’avant-poste de la bataille. Toutefois, Douguine se désole que « la position du pouvoir russe contemporain envers l’Occident (dans son incarnation actuelle) demeure indéterminée. Le pouvoir a rejeté un occidentalisme direct sans pour autant occuper une position alternative (slavophile, eurasiste). Le pouvoir s’est figé, de même que quelquefois un ordinateur cesse de fonctionner. Ni dans une direction, ni dans l’autre (p. 165) ». Il déplore que les blindés ne se soient pas entrés dans Tbilissi à l’été 2008. Ces atermoiements sont préjudiciables à la Russie qui, en tant que Troisième Rome potentiel, pourrait déjà pratiquer une diplomatie multipolaire, « même si actuellement seuls l’Iran, le Venezuela, la Syrie, la Bolivie, le Nicaragua, la Corée du Nord, la Biélorussie et, avec prudence, la Chine, la défendent (p. 163) ».

 

Dépassement des idéologies modernes et formulation nouvelle d’un conservatisme traditionnel et impérial, « la Quatrième théorie apparaît donc comme un projet de “ croisade ” contre le postmoderne, la société post-industrielle, le projet libéral réalisé dans la pratique, le globalisme et ses fondements logistiques et technologiques (p. 23) ». C’est une déclaration de guerre qu’il convient d’apprécier ! L’assomption de l’Europe passe bien par la Quatrième théorie politique.

 

Georges Feltin-Tracol

 

• Alexandre Douguine, La Quatrième théorie politique. La Russie et les idées politiques du XXIe siècle, avant-propos d’Alain Soral, Ars Magna Éditions, Nantes, 2012, 336 p., (B.P. 60 426, 44004 Nantes C.E.D.E.X. 1). Pour recevoir le livre, écrire à l’éditeur, en accompagnant cette demande d’un chèque de 32 € franco.

 

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Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

 

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An interview with Manuel Ochsenreiter

The Fourth Political Theory

An interview with Manuel Ochsenreiter

Ex: http://www.granews.info/

 

Natella Speranskaya: How did you discover the Fourth Political Theory? And how would you evaluate its chances of becoming a major ideology of the 21st century?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: Since a certain time I try to follow the developments in Russia, especially Prof. Alexandr Dugin. So it is not a coincidence to get in touch with the Fourth Political Theory. You are asking about the chances. Let me say it like this: The west is actually trapped in its own liberalism. It seems right now that there is no way out because the liberal mainstream political opinion doesn´t accept any alternative ideas. It is like digesting yourself with the same acid over and over again. In my opinion, the Fourth Political Theory could be a medical cure for that sick intellectual situation. It can be a way out of the liberal hamster wheel. And more and more people are looking for such an exit.
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: Leo Strauss when commenting on the fundamental work of Carl Schmitt The Concept of the Political notes that despite all radical critique of liberalism incorporated in it Schmitt does not follow it through since his critique remains within the scope of liberalism”. “His anti-Liberal tendencies, – claims Strauss, - remain constrained by “systematics of liberal thought” that has not been overcome so far, which – as Schmitt himself admits – “despite all failures cannot be substituted by any other system in today’s Europe. What would you identify as a solution to the problem of overcoming the liberal discourse? Could you consider the Fourth Political Theory by Alexander Dugin to be such a solution? The theory that is beyond the three major ideologies of the 20th century – Liberalism, Communism and Fascism, and that is against the Liberal doctrine.
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: First of all, the liberal doctrine is a totalitarian doctrine. Convinced liberals hate to hear that. They even would deny that it is a “doctrine”. But the reality is: The world wide liberalism and the postmodernism of “values” seem to be more totalitarian than communism, fascism or any –isms before. Liberalism doesn´t accept alternative ideas coexisting beside it. It shows its ugly totalitarian face every day all over the world and its sharpest sword is hypocrisy. The liberal “tolerance”, one of the most mentioned and beloved liberal values just enjoy other liberals. There is no tolerance towards non-liberals. The west showed a couple of times in the past towards some countries who didn’t adjust to this liberal world order, what that can mean at the end: If other societies, people, and countries are not convinced by NGOs, “civil society” and other forms of “western help”, they will be convinced by drones and Cruise missiles. The liberal west tells the beloved stories about “human rights” violations to convince the western societies about the necessity of such military operations. Liberals liberate with money or bombs. The choice is upto the “backwarded” aim. But at the end, everybody knows the “open society” (Karl Popper) means in reality “open market”, “free speech” means “liberal speech” and “freedom of choice” means “McDonalds or Burger King”. There is even a liberal “new speech” for these things: Military ground offensives are now “humanitarian zones”, air raids are “installing a no-flight zone” and ugly primitive Russian girls urge the west to shout “Free Pussy riot!”.
 
 
Every established intellectual, politician or media company moves inside this totalitarian liberal system. For example you will not find any established political party in the German parliament that doesn´t claim to be “also liberal”. Our universities “research” about “identities”, “gender”, and “culture” to change this or that. The new liberal types of human being don´t have a heritage, homeland or cultural identity. Even the gender can be changed. We could consider that as a type of slapstick comedy if it wouldn´t be so serious, because it means a type of destruction of basics and values, which might be hard to repair.
 
 
So Prof. Dugin’s theory shows an emergency exit out of this totalitarian system. It is like opening a window to let some fresh air into the western paralyzed intellectual environment. But the liberalism is not a weak ideology which would wait for its defeat.
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: Do you agree that today there are “two Europes”: the one – the liberal one (incorporating the idea of “open society”, human rights, registration of same-sex marriages, etc.) and the other Europe (“a different Europe”) – politically engaged, thinker, intellectual, spiritual, the one that considers the status quo and domination of liberal discourse as a real disaster and the betrayal of the European tradition. How would you evaluate chances of victory of a “different Europe” over the ”first” one?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: This reminds me to the “old Europe” and the “new Europe” Donald Rumsfeld was talking about in 2003. The “old Europe” was the one that refused to support the US in the Iraq war, especially Germany and France, and the “new Europe” joined the „coalition of the willing“. But of course you mean something else with your question. There is certainly a “different Europe”. We wouldn´t be talking if it didn´t exist. In all the European countries you see certain types of intellectual resistance against the liberal totalitarian system. I would even call this type of Europe the “real” one. Because the official “Europe” is just a weird construction that denies traditions and differences, everything what makes the rich nature of Europe and the Europeans.
 
 
The “real Europe” is everywhere, where intellectuals, journalists, and politicians turn their back to Brussels and the liberal system. You find it in a huge amount of magazines, newspapers, internet forums, and political organizations all over the continent. They do it without any powerful support from other countries, just with their idealism. There are no NGOs or other institutions that fund that important work. But this shows exactly that type of these new political grassroots.  
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: “There is nothing more tragic than a failure to understand the historical moment we are currently going through; - notes Alain de Benoist – this is the moment of postmodern globalization”. The French philosopher emphasizes the significance of the issue of a new Nomos of the Earth or a way of establishing international relations. What do you think the fourth Nomos will be like? Would you agree that the new Nomos is going to be Eurasian and multipolar (transition from universum to pluriversum)?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: Western liberal propaganda always claims: “Even if we wanted, we couldn´t do something else because it would result in violence and war!” They spread panic and fear among the people. You have to imagine, our German politicians tell us that even if we Europeans would abolish the Euro currency, we might end up in a war. The postmodern globalization is presented as the only single way for the future. I spoke about liberal hypocrisy before. The truth is that the way of globalization is a painful and bloody one as we can see in many countries with western “liberation” attempts. It is a hamster wheel of wars and more wars. The longer it goes the more blood is spilt. This logic is as simple as cruel.
 
 
Why is it like this? After the downfall of the Soviet Union and the communist eastern block, western political scientists (Charles Krauthammer, Francis Fukuyama and many others) welcomed more or less the “unipolar moment”; one world with one pole which was the west. This idea was like a western “idyll”. With “Western democracy” and “western freedom” spreading all over the world also to the last little corner, mankind will face a long-term, a “final” period of peace and prosperity. Although we see every day in the news the evidence of failure of this ideology, the west still works on it. As I already said, since the end of the Cold war and the geopolitical attempts of the west to install this unipolar idea, we witness the chaotic and violent results of this sort of geopolitics.
 
 
A multipolar international order is not just the answer. It is a logical result. The question is how will this multipolar order be organized? A well-organized multipolar world would not just bring stability, but would also be a great intellectual chance of cultural exchange on a really high level. It recognizes the value of “difference” while the west today propagandizes worldwide equality and unity. The local and regional cultures would have the chance of free development, tradition, and cultural identity (both is denied by the western ideology) that could prosper. The actual western hegemony with the means of NGOs and media tries to push down these things, but not forever. And of course Eurasia will play an important role.
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: Do you agree that the era of the white European human race has ended, and the future will be predetermined by Asian cultures and societies?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: Today’s Europe is losing its human substance. It shows once more that the liberal ideology is a suicidal idea. On the one hand it fights against families and promotes for example abortion; on the other hand it campaigns extremely for mass immigration. The consequence is extinction of the Europeans. How long it takes is pure mathematics. How much the face of Europe already has changed you can witness in any European capital between Lisbon and Athens. We cannot say that the quality of the human resources really become better by immigration even if we would consider that as a neutral or even “positive” development as the liberals do. In contradiction, we face a lot of problems with immigrant communities. The liberal ideology refuses to see the reasons where they are: in ethnic backgrounds. They just speak about an alleged “discrimination” of the migrant communities and about the alleged social injustice the migrants are facing. Politics denying ethnic differences deny the reality.
 
 
Of course this development weakens Europe. We are busier more and more with “integration”, what means with ourselves. You have really to be an anti-realist to see a benefit in that suicidal development. But this exactly is told by the liberal dogma. This means automatically that other entities and cultures who don´t suffer under such development will have an advantage against a weak Europe.
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: Do you consider Russia to be a part of Europe or do you accept the view that Russia and Europe represent two different civilizations?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: I don´t see a contradiction. I personally consider Russia as a European country, of course with diverse ethnic groups. And of course it has its own culture, traditions, and identity. But every European country has its own culture and traditions. The only difference is, we Europeans are told nonstop by the Brussels propaganda that we are all somehow “the same”. The Russians have the benefit not being bombarded by that ridiculous nonsense. For me as a German, Russia should be our close friend and ally. We share a lot of interests, we share a common history of course with ups and downs – at least Moscow is closer to us than Washington. A close relationship to Russia would be in the national interest of Berlin and Moscow.
 
 
Natella Speranskaya: Contemporary ideologies are based on the principle of secularity. Would you predict the return of religion, the return of sacrality? If so, in what form? Do you consider it to be Islam, Christianity, Paganism or any other forms of religion?
 
 
Manuel Ochsenreiter: When people start worshipping their bank accounts, the horoscopes in the yellow press magazines or their luxury cars what does that tell us about the alleged absence of religion? When it is forbidden to deny liberalism as it used to be forbidden to deny the existence of god in the Middle Ages? The “secularity” in today’s Europe just refers to the power of the organized religion, but obviously not to the needs of the people. When the religion disappears they find something else. In Berlin housewives are running into Buddhist temples because they adore the eternal smile of the Dalai Lama or the haircut of Richard Gere. Of course they don´t understand anything about the spirituality of Buddhism. Trendy Businessmen do some yoga exercises. Others start doing esoteric things. But this is also an element of liberalism: superficiality. While this is happening, the organized churches are more and more weakened themselves by the liberal virus. Sometimes it is really hard to see the difference between a protestant bishop and a liberal teacher. It is somehow ironic that God comes back to Europe in these days as a Muslim migrant. All of a sudden people go on the streets to protest against blasphemy. And this takes place at the same time when “Christian” clerics in Germany seriously support the blasphemy group “Pussy riot”.
 
 
So we see on the one side the spiritual needs of the people, but on the other side also today’s Christian churches’ refusal to serve those needs. Of course there are also some exceptions. But the general situation especially in Germany and other central and western European countries is like that.
 
 
I personally don´t believe that a new type of paganism might be a dominant religious power in Europe. Why? Because it would be a pure artificial concept for the people. The strength of the churches in the past was their ties to the traditional daily life of the people. Especially Catholicism perfected to adopt and integrate old pagan traditions in its system. If Europe recovers, I am sure that maybe a new type of European Christianity would also recover. It would be a logic thing. When liberalism starts to disappear, it´s totalitarian system will also disappear. Even the Bishops of liberalism like George Soros would lose their power. But if Europe falls, the last of the “three Romes” will be Moscow – and the only resistance against the liberalist doctrine in Europe will be done by the Muslim communities while the organized Christians celebrate their own downfall. 

La Russie, l’Occident et l’Allemagne

 

La Russie, l’Occident et l’Allemagne

 

Extrait d’un entretien accordé par Alexandre Douguine au magazine allemand “Zuerst”

 

Q.: Monsieur Douguine, l’Occident ne se trouve-t-il pas dans une mauvaise situation?

 

AD: Absolument. Mais la situation dans laquelle se débat l’Occident est différente de celle en laquelle se débat la Russie. Regardez l’Europe: l’UE se trouve dans un état de crise profonde; la rue en Grèce se rebelle ouvertement, l’Europe centrale et septentrionale croupit sous les charges sociales, politiques et économiques apportée par l’immigration de masse depuis ces dernières décennies. Même les Etats-Unis sont plongés dans une crise profonde. Mais, pourtant, c’est cette crise qui va faire se corser la situation. Car dans de telles situations d’instabilité et de précarité, ce sont toujours les partisans de lignes dures qui finissent par avoir le dessus. Aux Etats-Unis, actuellement, on évoque ouvertement une guerre contre l’Iran, même si à New York un bon paquet de citoyens américains manifestent contre Wall Street. On ne discute plus que du moment idéal pour commencer la prochaine guerre. Lénine disait en son temps: hier, c’était trop tôt, demain ce sera trop tard.

 

Q.: Vous defendez l’idée d’une alliance eurasiatique. Cette idée n’implique-t-elle pas que les Etats européens se détachent progressivement de l’UE bruxelloise, un processus à prévoir pour le moyen voire le long terme, et se donnent de nouvelles orientations. Est-ce là une hypothèse réaliste?

 

AD: La Russie est l’allié naturel d’une Europe libre et indépendante. Il n’y a donc pas d’autres options. Bien sûr, l’Europe actuelle n’envisage pas cette option, car elle est systématiquement refoulée par le fan-club transatlantique des égéries des “Pussy riots”. Mais cela pourrait bien vite changer. Qui imaginait, au début de l’été 1989, que le Mur de Berlin allait tomber en automne? Une poignée d’esprits lucides que l’établissement considérait comme fous ou dangereux.

 

Q.: Comment voyez-vous l’avenir des relations germano-russes, tout en sachant que celles-ci ont été jadis bien meilleures?

 

AD: Il y a beaucoup de liens entre l’Allemagne et la Russie. Nous avons une longue histoire commune. On aime à l’oublier aujourd’hui, surtout dans le vaste Occident. Lors de la signature de la convention de Tauroggen en 1812, le Lieutenant-Général prussien Johann David von Yorck a négocié de son propre chef un armistice entre le corps prussien, contraint par Napoléon de participer à la campagne de Russie, et l’armée du Tsar Alexandre. La Russie a soutenu la révolte prussienne contre les Français, ce qui a permis de lancer la guerre de libération des peuples contre Napoléon. La diplomatie russe a permis aussi en 1871 que le Reich allemand de Bismarck puisse devenir réalité  sur l’échiquier européen. La Russie a toujours soutenu le principe d’une Allemagne forte sur le continent européen. Otto von Bismarck recevait souvent l’appui de Saint-Pétersbourg. Ce ne sont là que deux exemples: la liste des coopérations germano-russes est longue et, à chaque fois, les deux protagonistes en ont bénéficié. Sur le plan culturel, les relations sont tout aussi étroites: philosophes russes et allemands s’appréciaient, se sentaient sur la même longueur d’onde. Mais nous nous sommes également opposés dans des guerres sanglantes mais, Dieu merci, cette époque est désormais révolue.

 

Q.: Et aujourd’hui?

 

L’Allemagne est le pilier porteur de l’économie européenne. L’économie européenne, c’est en réalité l’économie allemande. L’idée sous-jacente de l’économie allemande diffère considérablement de l’idée qui sous-tend la praxis économique du capitalisme occidental et britannique. En Allemagne, on mise sur l’industrie, de même que sur une création de valeurs réelles par le biais de la production de biens et non pas sur le capitalisme financier et bancaire qui, lui, ne repose sur rien de matériel. Aujourd’hui l’Allemagne est contrôlée par une élite exclusivement imprégnée d’idéologie “transatlantique”, qui empêche tout rapprochement avec la Russie. En Russie, on a aujourd’hui des sentiments pro-allemands. Poutine, on le sait, passe pour un grand ami de l’Allemagne. Mais malgré cela, le gouvernement de Berlin, et aussi l’opposition à ce gouvernement, essaie d’intégrer encore davantage l’Allemagne dans une UE en mauvaise posture, tout en renonçant à de larges pans de la souveraineté allemande. Pour l’Allemagne, une telle situation est dramatique!

 

Q.: Dans quelle mesure?

 

AD: L’Allemagne est aujourd’hui un pays occupé, déterminé par l’étranger. Les Américains contrôlent tout. L’élite politique allemande n’est pas libre. Conséquence? Berlin ne peut pas agir pour le bien du pays comme il le faudrait, vu la situation. Pour le moment, l’Allemagne est gouvernée par une élite qui travaille contre ses propres intérêts. Nous, les Russes, pouvons aider l’Allemagne parce que nous comprenons mieux la situation de votre pays, en état de servilité, et parce que nous travaillons à créer des réseaux germano-russes en divers domaines. Nous pourrions travailler avec divers groupes au sein de la République Fédérale, nous pourrions améliorer nos relations culturelles. Je crois fermement qu’un jour se recomposera une Allemagne libre, forte et autonome en Europe, qui lui permettra de jouer un rôle d’intermédiaire entre l’Est et l’Ouest du sous-continent. Le rôle que jouent actuellement les vassaux de l’eurocratie bruxelloise et de Washington ne permet pas de forger un vrai destin pour l’Allemagne.

 

Q.: Monsieur Douguine, nous vous remercions de nous avoir accordé cet entretien.

 

Entretien paru dans le magazine “Zuerst!”, Oktober 2012, http://www.zuerst.de/ ).

Een interview met Alexander Doegin

Een interview met Alexander Doegin

Inleiding

In februari 2012 reisde professor Alexander Doegin naar New Delhi, India, om er deel te nemen aan het 40ste Wereldcongres van het International Institute of Sociology, waarvan het thema dit jaar in volgend teken stond: “After Western Hegemony: Social Science and its Publics.”

Professor Doegin was zo vriendelijk om wat tijd vrij te maken voor enkele vragen vanwege medewerkers van Arktos die eveneens op het congres aanwezig waren. 

We hebben in dit interview gepoogd om professor Doegin enkele van zijn basisconcepten te laten verduidelijken om zodoende de verwarring en de desinformatie weg te nemen die rond hem en zijn beweging, de Eurazische Beweging, en haar zijtak in de Engelstalige wereld, de Global Revolutionary Alliance, hangen. Het interview werd afgenomen door Daniel Friberg, CEO, en John B. Morgan, hoofdredacteur van Arktos.

Dit interview werd gepubliceerd op het moment dat professor Doegin als spreker aanwezig was op Identitarian Ideas 2012, georganiseerd door de Zweedse organisatie Motpol in Stockholm op 28 juli 2012, en verliep tegelijk met de publicatie, door Arktos, van professor Doegins boek The Fourth Political Theory (http://www.arktos.com/alexander-dugin-the-fourth-political-theory.html ^[5]). Dit is het eerste boek van de hand van professor Doegin in het Engels.

In het Westen leeft de perceptie dat u een Russische nationalist bent. Voelt u zich hierdoor aangesproken?

Het concept van de natie is een kapitalistisch, westers concept. Daartegenover staat het Eurazisme, dat zich richt op culturele en etnische verschillen, en niet op éénmaking op basis van het individu, zoals het nationalisme vooropstelt. Wij verschillen van het nationalisme, doordat we een pluraliteit van waarden verdedigen. Wij verdedigen ideeën, niet onze gemeenschap; ideeën, niet onze maatschappij. Wij dagen de postmoderniteit uit, maar niet enkel namens de Russische natie. De postmoderniteit is een gapende leegte. Rusland vormt slechts een deel van de globale strijd. Het is zeker en vast een belangrijk deel, maar het vormt niet het uiteindelijke doel. Voor onze medestanders in Rusland kunnen we Rusland niet redden, zonder tegelijkertijd de wereld te redden. Net zoals we de wereld niet kunnen redden, zonder Rusland te redden.

Het gaat niet enkel om een strijd tegen het westerse universalisme. Het gaat om een strijd tegen alle, ook islamitische vormen van universalisme. We aanvaarden geen enkele politiek die universalisme wil opdringen aan anderen – westers, noch islamitisch, noch socialistisch, noch liberaal, noch Russisch. Wij zijn niet de verdedigers van het Russische imperialisme of revanchisme, maar wel van een globale visie en multipolariteit die gebaseerd zijn op de dialectiek van de beschaving. Onze tegenstanders beweren dat de veelheid aan beschavingen noodzakelijkerwijs leidt tot een clash. Deze bewering is fout. De globalisering en de Amerikaanse hegemonie leiden zonder uitzondering tot bloedige inmenging en geweld tussen beschavingen, waar er vrede, dialoog, of conflict zouden kunnen zijn, afhankelijk van de historische omstandigheden. Maar het opleggen van een heimelijke hegemonie leidt tot conflicten en, onvermijdelijk, erger in de toekomst. Ze hebben het dus over vrede, maar voeren oorlog. Wij verdedigen de gerechtigheid – niet oorlog of vrede, maar gerechtigheid en dialoog en het naturlijk recht van elke cultuur om haar identiteit te bewaren en te streven naar wat ze wil zijn. Niet enkel historisch, zoals in het multiculturalisme, maar ook in de toekomst. We moeten onszelf bevrijden van die zogezegde universalismen.

Welke rol dicht u Rusland toe bij het organiseren van de antimoderne krachten?

Het opzetten van antiglobalistische, of eerder antiwesterse, bewegingen en stromingen in heel de wereld bestaat uit verschillende stappen. Het gaat er fundamenteel om mensen te verenigen in hun strijd tegen het status quo. Dus, wat bedoel ik precies met status quo? Het gaat hier om een reeks met elkaar verbonden fenomenen die een belangrijke shift van moderniteit naar postmoderniteit met zich meebrengen. Het wordt vormgegeven door een shift van de unipolaire wereld, op de eerste plaats in de vorm van de invloed van de Verenigde Staten en West-Europa, naar een zogenaamde niet-polariteit, zoals ze zichtbaar wordt in de huidige impliciete hegemonie en in de revoluties die erdoor worden georchestreerd via handlangers, zoals bijvoorbeeld de oranje revoluties. Het hoofddoel van het Westen achter deze strategie is de definitieve controle over de planeet, niet enkel door middel van directe interventie, maar ook via een universalisering van zijn waarden, normen en ethiek.

Het status quo van de liberale hegemonie van het Westen is wereldomvattend geworden. Het gaat om de verwestersing van de hele mensheid. Dat betekent dat zijn normen, zoals de vrije markt, vrijhandel, liberalisme, parlementaire democratie, mensenrechten, en absoluut individualisme universeel zijn geworden. Deze normenset wordt verschillend geïnterpreteerd in verschillende regio’s van de wereld, maar het Westen beschouwt zijn specifieke interpretatie als vanzelfsprekend en de verspreiding ervan als onvermijdelijk. Dit is niets meer of minder dan een kolonisering van de geest. Het gaat hier om een nieuwe vorm van kolonialisme, een nieuwe vorm van macht, en een nieuwe vorm van controle, die in de praktijk wordt gebracht door middel van een netwerk. Iedereen die aangesloten is op het globale netwerk wordt onderworpen aan zijn code. Dit maakt deel uit van het postmoderne Westen, en wordt in snel tempo globaal doorgevoerd. De prijs die door een natie moet worden betaald om deel te kunnen uitmaken van het globale netwerk van het Westen is het aanvaarden van deze normen. Dit is de nieuwe hegemonie van het Westen. Het is een opschuiven van de open hegemonie van het Westen, zoals het kolonialisme en het openlijke imperialisme van het verleden, naar een meer impliciete, subtielere versie.

Om deze globale bedreiging van de mensheid te bestrijden is het belangrijk om alle verschillende krachten te verenigen, die zichzelf vroeger als anti-imperialistisch zouden hebben omschreven. Vandaag de dag moeten we onze vijand beter begrijpen. De vijand van vandaag leeft in het verborgene. Hij handelt door gebruik te maken van de normen en waarden van het westerse ontwikkelingspad en door de pluraliteit van andere culturen en beschavingen te negeren. Vandaag roepen we iedereen op die de geldigheid erkent van de specifieke waarden van niet-Westerse beschavingen, en waar er andere vormen van waarden bestaan, om op te staan tegen deze poging tot globale universalisering en verborgen hegemonie.

We kunnen in dezen spreken van een culturele, filosofische, ontologische en eschatologische strijd, omdat we in het status quo de essentie van het Donkere Tijdperk, of het grote paradigma terugvinden. Maar we moeten ook evolueren van een zuiver theoretische benadering naar een praktisch, geopolitiek niveau. En op dit geopolitiek niveau behoudt Rusland het potentieel, de middelen en de wil om deze uitdaging aan te gaan, omdat de Russische geschiedenis van oudsher instinctief gericht was tegen dezelfe horizon. Rusland is een grote macht, bij wie er een acuut bewustzijn heerst van wat er gaande is in de wereld, en bij wie men zich terdege bewust is van de eigen eschatologische missie. Het is daarom evident dat Rusland een centrale rol zou spelen in deze anti-status quo-coalitie. Rusland heeft zijn identiteit verdedigd tegen het katholicisme, het protestantisme en het moderne Westen tijdens de tsaristische periode, en tegen het liberale kapitalisme tijdens de Sovjettijd. Nu zien we een derde golf van deze strijd – de strijd tegen de postmoderniteit, het ultraliberalisme, en de globalisering. Maar dit keer is Rusland niet meer in staat om enkel en alleen te teren op zijn eigen mogelijkheden. Het kan niet langer alleen maar vechten onder het banier van het Orthodoxe Christendom. Het opnieuw invoeren van of het vertrouwen op de marxistische doctrine is evenmin een optie, aangezien het marxisme zelf één van de hoofdwortels van de destructieve ideeën van de postmoderniteit vormt.

Rusland is vandaag slechts één van de vele deelnemers aan deze globale strijd, en het kan deze strijd niet alleeen aan. We moeten alle krachten die zich tegen de westerse normen en het daarmee verbonden economische systeem verzetten, verenigen. We moeten derhalve allianties smeden met alle linkse sociale en politieke bewegingen die het status quo van het liberale kapitalisme in vraag stellen. We moeten tevens allianties smeden met alle identitaire krachten in eender welke cultuur die de globalisering om culturele redenen verwerpen. Vanuit dit standpunt moeten islamitische bewegingen, hindoebewegingen, of nationalistische bewegingen uit de hele wereld als bondgenoten aanzien worden. Hindoes, boeddhisten, christenen, en heidense identitairen in Europa, Amerika of Latijns-Amerika, of andere cultuurtypes, moeten samen één front vormen. De idee hierachter is dat ze allemaal aan één zeel moeten trekken tégen de ene vijand en het ene kwaad, en vóór een veelheid van concepten van wat goed is.

Waar we tegen zijn, zal ons verenigen, en waar we voor zijn, verdeelt ons. Daarom moeten we de nadruk leggen op wat we bestrijden. De gezamenlijke vijand verenigt ons, terwijl de positieve waarden, die elk van ons verdedigt, ons verdelen.  Daarom moeten we strategische allianties aangaan om de huidige wereldorde omver te werpen, wier kern kan omschreven worden als een mix van mensenrechten, anti-hiërarchisch sentiment, en politieke correctheid – alles wat het gezicht van het Beest, de anti-Christ of, in een andere context, de Kali-Yuga uitmaakt.

Hoe past traditionalistische spiritualiteit in de Eurazische agenda?

Er bestaan geseculariseerde culturen, maar in hun kern blijft de geest van de Traditie, religieus of anderssoortig, bestaan. Door de veelheid, de pluraliteit, en het polycentrisme van culturen te verdedigen, doen we een beroep op de principes van hun essentie, die we enkel in de spirituele tradities kunnen vinden. Maar wij proberen deze houding te koppelen aan de nood aan sociale gerechtigheid en aan de vrijheid om maatschappijen van elkaar te laten verschillen in de hoop op betere politieke regimes. De idee hierachter is het koppelen van de geest van de Traditie aan de eis van sociale gerechtigheid. En wij willen ons niet tegen deze sociale krachten keren, omdat dát precies de strategie van de hegemoniale macht is: links en rechts verdelen, culturen verdelen, etnische groepen verdelen, Oost en West, moslims en christenen verdelen. We roepen rechts en links op zich te verenigen, en zich niet af te zetten tegen traditionalisme en spiritualiteit, tegen sociale gerechtigheid en tegen sociaal dynamisme. We staan dus rechts noch links. Wij zijn tegen de liberale postmoderniteit. Het is onze bedoeling om alle fronten te verenigen en onze tegenstanders niet toe te laten ons te verdelen. Blijven we verdeeld, dan kunnen ze ons makkelijk beheersen. Verenigen we ons, dan is hun rijk onmiddellijk uit. Dat is onze globale strategie. En wanneer we de spirituele traditie met sociale gerechtigheid verbinden, dan slaat de paniek de liberalen onmiddellijk om het hart. Daar zijn ze onnoemelijk bang voor.

Welke spirituele traditie zou iemand die zich wenst in te zetten voor de Eurazische strijd moeten volgen, en vormt dit een essentieel element?

Men moet ernaar streven om een levend onderdeel van de maatschappij te worden waarin men leeft, en de traditie volgen die daar toonaangevend is. Ikzelf ben bijvoorbeeld Russisch-Orthodox. Dat is mijn traditie. In andere omstandigheden kunnen sommige individuen evenwel een ander spiritueel pad kiezen. Wat belangrijk is, is dat men wortels heeft. Er bestaat geen universeel antwoord. Indien iemand deze spirituele basis verwaarloost, maar zich toch wil inschakelen in de strijd, is het goed mogelijk dat hij of zij gaandeweg een diepere betekenis vindt. Het is onze overtuiging dat onze vijand dieper wortelt dan in het zuiver menselijke. Het Kwaad ligt dieper dan de mensheid, hebzucht of uitbuiting. Zij die aan de zijde van het Kwaad vechten, zijn zij die geen spirituele basis hebben. Zij die zich tegen die basis verzetten, kunnen haar in de strijd tegenkomen. Of misschien niet. Het blijft een open vraag – er bestaat geen verplichting. Het valt aan te raden, maar het is geen noodzakelijke voorwaarde.

Wat vindt u van Europees Nieuw-Rechts en Julius Evola? En, meer bepaald, van hun beider afkeer van het Christendom?

Het is aan de Europeanen om te beslissen welke soort spiritualiteit zij willen doen herleven. Voor ons, Russen, is dat het Orthodoxe Christendom. Wij beschouwen onze traditie als authentiek.  Wij beschouwen onze traditie als een voortzetting van de vroegere, voorchristelijke tradities van Rusland, zoals die tot uiting komen in onze verering van heiligen en iconen, naast andere aspecten. Daarom is er geen tegenstelling tussen onze eerdere en latere tradities. Evola keert zich af van de christelijke traditie van het Westen. Wat interessant is, is zijn kritiek op de desacralisering van het westerse christendom. Dit strookt precies met de orthodoxe kritiek op het westerse christendom. Het is duidelijk dat de secularizering van het westerse christendom de mensheid liberalisme oplevert. De secularizering van de orthodoxe religie geeft ons communisme. Individualisme staat tegenover collectivisme. Voor ons ligt het probleem niet aan het christendom zelf, zoals in het Westen. Evola ondernam een poging om de Traditie te herstellen. Nieuw-Rechts tracht eveneens de westerse traditie te herstellen, wat heel goed is. Maar als Russisch-Orthodoxe kan ik niet beslissen welk pad Europa moet volgen, aangezien we verschillende waardensystemen hebben. Wij willen de Europeanen niet vertellen wat ze moeten doen, en we willen niet dat de Europeanen dat met ons doen. Als Eurazisten aanvaarden we elke oplossing. Aangezien Evola Europeaan was, kon hij discussiëren en voorstellen doen over de juiste oplossing voor Europa. Éénieder van ons kan slechts zijn of haar persoonlijke mening formuleren. Maar ik ben wel tot de conclusie gekomen dat we meer gemeen hebben met Nieuw-Rechts dan met de katholieken. Ik deel veel visies van Alain de Benoist. Ik beschouw hem als de grootste intellectueel in het Europa van vandaag. Dat is niet het geval voor de moderne katholieken. Zij willen Rusland bekeren, en dat botst met onze plannen. Nieuw-Rechts wil het Europese heidendom niet opleggen aan anderen. Ik beschouw Evola ook als een meester en als een symbolische figuur van de eindrevolte en de grootse wederopleving, net zoals Guénon. In mijn ogen zijn deze beide heren de essentie van de Westerse traditie in deze donkere tijd.

Eerder zei u dat Eurazisten zouden moeten samenwerken met bepaalde jihadistische groepen. Maar deze hebben de neiging om universalistisch te zijn, en hun doel is het opleggen van de islamitische wet aan de hele wereld. Wat zijn de toekomstkansen van een dergelijke coalitie?

Jihadi’s zijn universalisten, net zoals seculiere westerlingen die globalizering nastreven. Maar zij zijn niet identiek, want het westerse project probeert alle anderen te domineren en zijn hegemonie overal op te leggen. Het valt ons elke dag direct aan via de globale media, via modeverschijnselen, door voorbeelden te stellen voor de jeugd, enzovoort. We worden ondergedompeld in deze globale culturele hegemonie. Het salafistisch universalisme is een soort marginaal alternatief. Men mag hen niet over dezelfde kam scheren als zij die streven naar globalisering. Zij vechten ook tegen onze vijand. Wij willen van geen enkele universalistische stroming weten, maar er zijn universalisten die ons vandaag aanvallen en winnen, en er zijn ook nonconformistische universalisten die de hegemonie van het Westen, de liberale universalisten, bevechten, en derhalve hic et nunc tactische bondgenoten zijn.  Vooraleer hun project van een wereldomvattende islamitische staat kan worden gerealiseerd, zullen we nog vele veldslagen en conflicten uitvechten. En de globale liberale dominantie is een feit. Daarom roepen we iedereen op om samen met ons te strijden tegen deze hegemonie, dit status quo. Ik heb het liever over de realiteit van vandaag, dan over wat de toekomst zou kunnen brengen. Iedereen die zich kant tegen liberale hegemonie is nu onze medestander. Dat heeft niets vandoen met moraliteit, wel met strategie. Carl Schmitt zei ooit dat politiek begint met het onderscheid tussen vrienden en vijanden. Er bestaan geen eeuwige vrienden en geen eeuwige vijanden. Wij vechten tegen de bestaande universele hegemonie. Iedereen vecht daartegen voor zijn of haar eigen waardensysteem.

Om de samenhang te bewaren moeten we ook werk maken van een verlenging, verbreding, en van een bredere alliantie. Ik loop niet hoog op met de salafisten. Het zou veel beter zijn om samen te werken met traditionele Sufi’s, bijvoorbeeld. Maar ik werk liever samen met de salafisten tegen een gemeenschappelijke vijand dan energie te verspillen door hen te bevechten en de grotere berdreiging te negeren.

Wie voor de globale liberale hegemonie is, is de vijand. Wie ertegen is, is een vriend. De eerste is geneigd om deze hegemonie te aanvaarden; de andere revolteert.

Wat is, in het licht van de recente gebeurtenissen in Libië, uw persoonlijke opvatting over Khaddafi?

President Medvedev beging een ware misdaad tegen Khaddafi en hielp mee met het in de stijgers zetten van een hele reeks interventies in de Arabische wereld. Dit was een echte misdaad, begaan door onze President. Aan zijn handen kleeft bloed. Hij is een collaborateur van het Westen. De verantwoordelijkheid voor de misdaad - die de moord op Khaddafi effectief was - ligt gedeeltelijk bij hem. Wij Eurazisten verdedigden Khaddafi, niet omdat we fans of supporters van hem of zijn Groene Boekje waren, maar om principiële redenen. Achter de opstand in Libië ging westerse hegemonie schuil, en die legde een bloedige chaos op. Toen Khaddafi viel, werd de westerse hegemonie sterker. Dat was onze nederlaag. Maar niet de eindnederlaag. Deze oorlog kent vele fasen. We verloren een veldslag, maar niet de oorlog. En misschien ontstaat er wel iets nieuws in Libië, want de situatie is momenteel heel onstabiel. Zo versterkte de Irakoorlog bijvoorbeeld de invloed van Iran in de regio, in tegenstelling tot wat de westerse hegemonisten oorspronkelijk hadden uitgestippeld.

Gezien de situatie in Syrië momenteel, herhaalt het scenario zichzelf. Al is het wel zo dat, met Poetin terug aan de macht, de situatie er veel beter voor staat. Hij is op zijn minst consequent in zijn steun aan President al-Assad. Mogelijk is dit niet voldoende om een westerse interventie in Syrië af te houden. Ik pleit ervoor dat Rusland zijn bondgenoot daadkrachtiger zou steunen met wapens, financiële middelen, enzovoort. De val van Libië was een nederlaag voor Rusland. De val van Syrië zou opnieuw een mislukking zijn.

Wat denkt u van Vladimir Poetin, en hoe is uw verstandhouding met hem?

Hij was veel beter dan Jeltsin. Hij redde Rusland in de jaren ’90 van de volledige ineenstorting. Rusland stond op de rand van de catastrofe. Vóór de komst van Poetin hadden liberalen westerse stijl het voor het zeggen in de Russische politiek. Poetin herstelde de soevereiniteit van de Russische staat. Daarom werd ik een aanhanger van hem. Maar na 2003 zette Poetin zijn patriotische, Eurazische hervormingen stop, schoof hij de ontwikkeling van een echte nationale strategie opzij, en begon met het accomoderen van de economische liberalen die van Rusland een deel van het globaliseringsproject wilden maken. Daardoor verloor hij aan legitimiteit, en werd ik steeds kritischer ten opzichte van hem. In bepaalde gevallen werkte ik samen met mensen uit zijn entourage om hem te steunen in bepaalde beleidsdomeinen, en in andere domeinen stond ik lijnrecht tegenover hem. Toen Medvedev werd uitverkoren als zijn opvolger was dat een catastrofe, omdat de mensen rond hem allemaal liberalen waren. Ik was tegen Medvedev. Ik kantte me tegen hem, deels vanuit een Eurazistisch standpunt. Nu komt Poetin terug. Alle liberalen zijn tegen hem, en alle prowesterse krachten zijn tegen hem. Maar hijzelf heeft zijn houding tegenover hen nog niet verduidelijkt. Maar hij moet absoluut de steun van het Russische volk opnieuw verwerven. Anders kan hij onmogelijk verder doen. Hij bevindt zich in een kritische situatie, al lijkt hij dat niet te vatten. Hij twijfelt nog om de patriotische kant te kiezen. Hij denkt nog steun te kunnen vinden bij de liberalen, wat volkomen verkeerd is. Ik sta tegenwoordig minder kritisch tegenover hem dan vroeger, maar ik denk dat hij zich in een lastig parket bevindt. Indien hij verder aarzelt, zal hij mislukken. Ik heb recent een boek gepubliceerd, Putin Versus Putin, want zijn grootste vijand is hijzelf. Omdat hij twijfelt, verliest hij steeds meer de steun van het volk. Het Russische volk voelt zich bedrogen door hem. Hij is zoiets als een autoritaire leider zonder autoritair charisma. Ik heb in bepaalde gevallen met hem samengewerkt, maar heb mij ook tegen hem gekant in andere gevallen. Ik heb contact met hem. Maar er cirkelen zovele krachten rond hem. De liberalen en de Russische patrioten rondom hem zijn niet bepaald briljant te noemen, op intellectueel vlak. Daarom kan hij enkel vertrouwen op zichzef en zijn intuïtie. Maar intuïtie mag niet de enige bron van politieke beleidskeuzes en strategie zijn. Indien hij terug aan de macht komt zal hij gedwongen worden om terug te keren naar zijn vroeger antiwesters beleid, omdat onze maatschappij van nature antiwesters is. Rusland heeft een lange traditie van opstand tegen vreemde indringers en van hulp aan anderen die tegen onrechtvaardigheid strijden, en het Russische volk ziet de wereld door deze lens. Het zal geen genoegen nemen met een leider die bestuurt zonder rekening te houden met deze traditie.

Bron: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/07/interview-with-alexander-dugin/.

 

Dugin Gets in the Ring

Whither the Fourth Political Theory?

By Colin Liddell

 

Ex: http://www.alternativeright.com/

 

The Fourth Political Theory

 

 

 

is a book that is clearly not short on ambition. I haven’t actually read it, but I already know more or less what is in it from past writings by its author Professor Alexander Dugin, as well as the lengthy video presentation he gave of his ideas at the Identitarian Ideas conference held earlier this year in Stockholm.

 

Dugin believes there have been three great ideologies in modern history – Liberalism, Communism, and Fascism/National Socialism – and that we are now seeing the formation of the Fourth, which is still waiting to be properly christened and so is known by an ordinal. In the footsteps of Locke, Marx, and Mussolini, we now have Dugin.

I greatly respect and like Dugin. With his Tolstoyan beard and aura of an old church father, he’s a personable and reassuring presence. But I also know how the academic world works, and how it finds all sorts of clever ways to serve different masters, and Professor Dugin is certainly well-connected to a lot of people in the Russian establishment. Is it a coincidence that his ideas support the existence of the Russian Orthodox Church or the multi-ethnic imperialism that is the unavoidable basis for a strong Russian state?

But onto the Fourth Political Theory, with its Millenialist feel of being the fourth and final horseman of the ideological apocalypse. OK, the Theory straps a cushion to its forehead by claiming to be a work in progress, so that any blows landed on it will be softened, but already much of the groundwork has been clearly laid. The road isn’t finished, but we can more or less see where it is headed under the guidance of Professor Dugin.

The Theory supposedly arises from the criticism and deconstruction of the previous three theories, which history has already revealed to be full of flaws and responsible for a great deal of suffering and confusion. Dugin seems happy enough to ride along with modern Liberalism’s historical demolition of Marxism and Fascism, as this makes it a tidy knuckle-to-knuckle, winner-takes-all match between his Fourth Theory and the still undefeated champion, Liberalism.

Seconds out – Ding! Ding! Ding!

Despite past attempts by the Second and Third Theories to claim the crown of modernity, Dugin believes that Liberalism has triumphed here and has managed to irrevocably present itself as the only truly “modern” way. It has also succeeded in presenting itself as the “natural order,” rather than a mere ideology.

To destroy Liberalism, Dugin strikes as these points. But rather than trying to claim that the Fourth Theory is more modern than Liberalism, his strategy is to try to get away from the whole idea of modernity itself by appealing to pre-modern values and conceptualizing them as post-modern eternal values. There is more than a touch of his Old Believer Russian Orthodoxy here.

This is not so much a heavy punch to the ribs of Liberalism as a bit of fancy footwork to avoid Liberalism’s nasty left hook. Modernity is not so easily discarded, as Dugin seems to believe. It operates as the measure of ideological victory, without which no battle can take place. His call to discard modernity is therefore a call for a defensive ceasefire or a time out.

Another key point for Dugin to attack is the subjects or agents of the other three theories. The economic classes of Marxism are presented as outmoded; Fascism’s state as something of a bourgeois innovation; and National Socialist race as a “kind of construction” and not very useful.

Although his punches are only glancing ones here, it does not matter, as these two systems are supposedly punch-drunk losers propping up the bar, muttering “I coulda been a contender.” Where Dugin is more effective is in battering Liberalism’s all-important individual.

This is his mighty opponent’s soft spot and Dugin makes hay here and even gets into position to unleash his KO, but this is where his attack comes unstuck. While all the previous systems have strong subjects/agents that human beings can all feel passionate about – race, nation, class, and our own beloved selves – the Fourth Theory substitutes Heidegger’s flat-footed and abstruse “Dasein” concept. You couldn’t imagine the Bastille being stormed or Stalingrad being held for the sheer pleasure of “being there”!

As a philosophical phrase that says very little by saying too much, it is appropriate that it is then extrapolated into a kind of blanket multi-polarity and call for a true multiculturalism (depoliticized in the case of Russia) and even multi-chronology. Regarding this latter concept, Dugin calls for a world where societies can exist that operate on different temporal patterns, such as cyclical, linear, or more complex. He also calls for the rejection of universal values and comparisons. This is clearly heavily defensive boxing, aimed at avoiding the clever jabs and looming thump that Liberalism is aiming at Putin’s Russia.

The Ascendant Order

Dugin’s interpretation of the previous three theories has a kind of grace, regularity, and ascendant pattern to it. There is natural and elegant progression from the individual to class, and from class to the state (or race). While the other three ideologies nobly struggled in the ring of modernity, and had subjects/agents that could inspire the masses, the Fourth Political Theory has a snatch of Heidegger embroidered on its boxing shorts and seems to be climbing through the ropes with its towel flying through the air behind it.

Perhaps the problem is ideology itself. While Dugin is happy to abandon notions of modernity, he is less happy to abandon ideology. This is only to be expected from an academic who eats, sleeps, and breathes ideology. So, do we actually need it?

Ideology has a progressive nature that does not endear it to many on the Right, but progress is essential in any system that is not based on pure stagnation. Even a cyclical system needs progress to get to the point of its collapse and rebirth. Ideology creates progress through competing with the status quo, or by helping a rising system to become manifest. Therefore, in addition to each ideology having a subject or an agent, history also demonstrates that it needs some kind of enemy or rival: Liberalism’s enemy was the old order; Marxism’s was Liberalism; Fascism’s was Marxism; and Neo-Liberalism’s was Fascism and Marxism.

The problem of the Neo-Liberal world order is that there seems no longer to be any enemy, thus endless stagnation looms. Progress will only arise when Neo-Liberalism in its turn becomes the defeated enemy. On this basis, a strong case exists for the necessity of a Fourth Ideology. But after this, will we need a fifth or sixth, and so on into infinity? The chances are that our technologically enhanced world cannot handle this kind of vast, intense dialectical struggle many times more, so it is essential that the Fourth Political Theory should internalize the engine of progress that has previously come from ideological conflict.

Escaping the Dialectical

As it now stands, the Fourth Political Theory is more a reflection of Russo-centric concerns, and also seems inconsistent with the broader ideological framework that Dugin has outlined. In order for it to gain wider credibility it will have to take on board some of the following points:

Firstly, it should be entirely divorced from any agenda that reflects specific political or religious goals or interests, such as those elements of Russian political pragmatism I constantly detect in Dugin’s work.

Secondly, modernity should not be abandoned. If we are to have an ideological battle, we need winners and losers, and we need a common standard by which to judge them. Communism understood this and so did Fascism, and both were ahead of Liberalism on points for most of their bouts. “Da Sein” and multi-chronology is a form of retreatism.

Thirdly, dismissing Communism and Fascism is premature. Although both were defeated, neither was a purely ideological defeat. Fascism’s defeat was mainly military, while Communism’s was economic. To use boxing terminology one last time, you could say that both were lucky knock outs. These two contestants should be readmitted to the ideological battle until they are defeated ideologically. Neo-liberalism is not capable of doing this. Only a later political theory will be capable of this.

Fourthly, the Fourth Political Theory should be adjusted to fit more neatly into Dugin’s grand pattern of ideological evolution. Only when this is done will it be successful. History shows that Marxism opposed but also used elements of Liberalism. Fascism opposed but also used elements of Marxism and to a lesser extent Liberalism. Therefore it seems likely that the Fourth Political Theory should oppose but also include elements of Fascism and to a lesser extent Marxism.

Fifthly, the Fourth Political Theory needs to find an appropriate subject/agent, one with an existence that the masses can relate to, and one that fits into the ascendant pattern of individual, class, and state/race. The only subject that fits this bill is humanity itself.

Sixthly, to avoid the dangers of endless stagnation and further dialectical struggles resulting in Armageddon, the Fourth Political Theory will need to internalize the progressive impetus.

A. Dugin, C. Preve e M. Fini, presentano "Eurasia" a Milano

A. Dugin, C. Preve e M. Fini, presentano "Eurasia" a Milano

1 + 2

 

Interview with Alexander Dugin

 

Interview with Alexander Dugin http://www.wermodandwermod.com/

Introduction

In February 2012, Professor Alexander Dugin traveled to New Delhi, India to attend the 40th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, the theme of which was “After Western Hegemony: Social Science and its Publics.” Professor Dugin was kind enough to take some time away from the conference to answer a few questions by representatives of Arktos who attended the event. 

In this interview, we attempted to have Professor Dugin clarify some of his basic beliefs in order to dispel the confusion and misrepresentations that exist about him and his movement, the Eurasian Movement, and its offshoot, the Global Revolutionary Alliance, in the English-speaking world. The interview was conducted by Daniel Friberg, CEO of Arktos, and John B. Morgan, Editor-in-Chief.

This interview is being released in conjunction with Prof. Dugin’s appearance at Identitarian Ideas 2012, being held by the Swedish organization Motpol in Stockholm on July 28, 2012, and the simultaneous release of Prof. Dugin’s book The Fourth Political Theory by Arktos (http://www.arktos.com/alexander-dugin-the-fourth-political-theory.html). This is the first book by Prof. Dugin to appear in the English language.

There is a perception in the West that you are a Russian nationalist. Do you identify with that description?

The concept of the nation is a capitalist, Western one. On the other hand, Eurasianism appeals to cultural and ethnic differences, and not unification on the basis of the individual, as nationalism presumes. Ours differs from nationalism because we defend a pluralism of values. We are defending ideas, not our community; ideas, not our society. We are challenging postmodernity, but not on behalf of the Russian nation alone. Postmodernity is a yawning abyss. Russia is only one part of this global struggle. It is certainly an important part, but not the ultimate goal. For those of us in Russia, we can’t save it without saving the world at the same time. And likewise, we can’t save the world without saving Russia.

It is not only a struggle against Western universalism. It is a struggle against all universalisms, even Islamic ones. We cannot accept any desire to impose any universalism upon others – neither Western, Islamic, socialist, liberal, or Russian. We defend not Russian imperialism or revanchism, but rather a global vision and multipolarity based on the dialectic of civilization. Those we oppose say that the multiplicity of civilizations necessarily implies a clash. This is a false assertion. Globalization and American hegemony bring about a bloody intrusion and trigger violence between civilizations where there could be peace, dialogue, or conflict, depending on historical circumstances. But imposing a hidden hegemony implies conflict and, inevitably, worse in the future. So they say peace but they make war. We defend justice – not peace or war, but justice and dialogue and the natural right of any culture to maintain its identity and to pursue what it wants to be. Not only historically, as in multiculturalism, but also in the future. We must free ourselves from these pretend universalisms.

What do you think Russia’s role will be in organizing the anti-modern forces?

There are different levels involved in the creation of anti-globalist, or rather anti-Western, movements and currents around the world. The basic idea is to unite the people who are fighting against the status quo. So, what is the status quo? It is a series of connected phenomena bringing about an important shift from modernity to post-modernity. It is shaped by a shift from the unipolar world, represented primarily by the influence of the United States and Western Europe, to so-called non-polarity as exemplified by today’s implicit hegemony and those revolutions that have been orchestrated by it through proxy, as for example the various Orange revolutions. The basic intent behind this strategy is for the West to eventually control the planet, not only through direct intervention, but also via the universalization of its set of values, norms, and ethics.

The status quo of the West’s liberal hegemony has become global. It is a Westernization of all of humanity. This means that its norms, such as the free market, free trade, liberalism, parliamentarian democracy, human rights, and absolute individualism have become universal. This set of norms is interpreted differently in the various regions of the world, but the West regards its specific interpretation as being both self-evident and its universalization as inevitable. This is nothing less than a colonization of the spirit and of the mind. It is a new kind of colonialism, a new kind of power, and a new kind of control that is put into effect through a network. Everyone who is connected to the global network becomes subjected to its code. It is part of the postmodern West, and is rapidly becoming global. The price a nation or a people has to pay to become connected to the West’s globalization network is acceptance of these norms. It is the West’s new hegemony. It is a migration from the open hegemony of the West, as represented by the colonialism and outright imperialism of the past, to an implicit, more subtle version.

To fight this global threat to humanity, it is important to unite all the various forces that would, in earlier times, have been called anti-imperialist. In this age, we should better understand our enemy. The enemy of today is hidden. It acts by exploiting the norms and values of the Western path of development and ignoring the plurality represented by other cultures and civilizations. Today, we invite all who insist on the worth of the specific values of non-Western civilizations, and where there other forms of values exist, to challenge this attempt at a global universalization and hidden hegemony.

This is a cultural, philosophical, ontological, and eschatological struggle, because in the status quo we identify the essence of the Dark Age, or the great paradigm. But we should also move from a purely theoretical stance to a practical, geopolitical level. And at this geopolitical level, Russia preserves the potential, resources and inclination to confront this challenge, because Russian history has long been intuitively oriented against the same horizon. Russia is a great power where there is an acute awareness of what is going on in the world, historically speaking, and a deep consciousness of its own eschatological mission. Therefore it is only natural that Russia should play a central part in this anti-status quo coalition. Russia defended its identity against Catholicism, Protestantism and the modern West during Tsarist times, and then against liberal capitalism during Soviet times. Now there is a third wave of this struggle – the struggle against postmodernity, ultra-liberalism, and globalization. But this time, Russia is no longer able to rely on its own resources. It cannot fight solely under the banner of Orthodox Christianity. Nor is reintroducing or relying on Marxist doctrine a viable option, since Marxism is in itself a major root of the destructive ideas constituting postmodernity.

Russia is now one of many participants in this global struggle, and cannot fight this fight alone. We need to unite all the forces that are opposed to Western norms and its economic system. So we need to make alliances with all the Leftist social and political movements that challenge the status quo of liberal capitalism. We should likewise ally ourselves with all identitarian forces in any culture that refuse globalism for cultural reasons. From this perspective, Islamic movements, Hindu movements, or nationalist movements from all over the world should also be regarded as allies. Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and pagan identitarians in Europe, America, or Latin America, or other types of cultures, should all form a common front. The idea is to unite all of them, against the single enemy and the singular evil for a multiplicity of concepts of what is good.

What we are against will unite us, while what we are for divides us. Therefore, we should emphasize what we oppose. The common enemy unites us, while the positive values each of us are defending actually divides us.  Therefore, we must create strategic alliances to overthrow the present order of things, of which the core could be described as human rights, anti-hierarchy, and political correctness – everything that is the face of the Beast, the anti-Christ or, in other terms, Kali-Yuga.

Where does traditionalist spirituality fit into the Eurasian agenda?

There are secularized cultures, but at the core of all of them, the spirit of Tradition remains, religious or otherwise. By defending the multiplicity, plurality, and polycentrism of cultures, we are making an appeal to the principles of their essences, which we can only find in the spiritual traditions. But we try to link this attitude to the necessity for social justice and the freedom of differing societies in the hope for better political regimes. The idea is to join the spirit of Tradition with the desire for social justice. And we don’t want to oppose them, because that is the main strategy of hegemonic power: to divide Left and Right, to divide cultures, to divide ethnic groups, East and West, Muslims and Christians. We invite Right and Left to unite, and not to oppose traditionalism and spirituality, social justice, and social dynamism. So we are not on the Right or on the Left. We are against liberal postmodernity. Our idea is to join all the fronts and not let them divide us. When we stay divided, they can rule us safely. If we are united, their rule will immediately end. That is our global strategy. And when we try to join the spiritual tradition with social justice, there is an immediate panic among liberals. They fear this very much.

Which spiritual tradition should someone who wishes to participate in the Eurasianist struggle adopt, and is this a necessary component?

One should seek to become a concrete part of the society in which one lives, and follow the tradition that prevails there. For example, I am Russian Orthodox. This is my tradition. Under different conditions, however, some individuals might choose a different spiritual path. What is important is to have roots. There is no universal answer. If someone neglects this spiritual basis, but is willing to take part in our struggle, during the struggle he may well find some deeper spiritual meaning. Our idea is that our enemy is deeper than the merely human. Evil is deeper than humanity, greed, or exploitation. Those who fight on behalf of evil are those who have no spiritual faith. Those who oppose it may encounter it.  Or, perhaps not. It is an open question – it is not obligatory. It is advisable, but not necessary.

What do you think of the European New Right and Julius Evola? And in particular, their respective opposition to Christianity?

It is up to the Europeans to decide which kind of spirituality to revive. For us Russians, it is Orthodox Christianity. We regard our tradition as being authentic.  We see our tradition as being a continuation of the earlier, pre-Christian traditions of Russia, as is reflected in our veneration of the saints and icons, among other aspects. Therefore, there is no opposition between our earlier and later traditions. Evola opposes the Christian tradition of the West. What is interesting is his critique of the desacralization of Western Christianity. This fits well with the Orthodox critique of Western Christianity. It is easy to see that the secularization of Western Christianity gives us liberalism. The secularization of the Orthodox religion gives us Communism. It is individualism versus collectivism. For us, the problem is not with Christianity itself, as it is in the West. Evola made an attempt to restore Tradition. The New Right also tries to restore the Western tradition, which is very good. But being Russian Orthodox, I cannot decide which is the right path for Europe to take, since we have a different set of values. We don’t want to tell the Europeans what to do, nor do we want to be told what to do by the Europeans. As Eurasianists, we’ll accept any solution. Since Evola was European, he could discuss and propose the proper solution for Europe. Each of us can only state our personal opinion. But I have found that we have more in common with the New Right than with the Catholics. I share many of the same views as Alain de Benoist. I consider him to be the foremost intellectual in Europe today. That it is not the case with modern Catholics. They wish to convert Russia, and that is not compatible with our plans. The New Right does not want to impose European paganism upon others. I also consider Evola to be a master and a symbolic figure of the final revolt and the great revival, as well as Guénon. For me, these two individuals are the essence of the Western tradition in this dark age.

In our earlier conversation, you mentioned that Eurasianists should work with some jihadist groups. However, they tend to be universalist, and their stated goal is the imposition of Islamic rule over the entire world. What are the prospects for making such a coalition work?

Jihadis are universalists, just as secular Westerners who seek globalization are. But they are not the same, because the Western project seeks to dominate all the others and impose its hegemony everywhere. It attacks us directly every day through the global media, fashions, by setting examples for youth, and so on. We are submerged in this global cultural hegemony. Salafist universalism is a kind of marginal alternative. They should not be thought of in the same way as those who seek globalization. They also fight against our enemy. We don’t like any universalists, but there are universalists who attack us today and win, and there are also non-conformist universalists who are fighting against the hegemony of the Western, liberal universalists, and therefore they are tactical friends for the time being. Before their project of a global Islamic state can be realized, we will have many battles and conflicts. And global liberal domination is a fact. We therefore invite everybody to fight alongside us against this hegemony, this status quo. I prefer to discuss what is the reality at present, rather than what may exist in the future. All those who oppose liberal hegemony are our friends for the moment. This is not morality, it is strategy. Carl Schmitt said that politics begins by distinguishing between friends and enemies. There are no eternal friends and no eternal enemies. We are struggling against the existing universal hegemony. Everyone fights against it for their own particular set of values.

For the sake of coherence we should also prolong, widen, and create a broader alliance. I don’t like Salafists. It would be much better to align with traditionalist Sufis, for example. But I prefer working with the Salafists against the common enemy than to waste energy in fighting against them while ignoring the greater threat.

If you are in favor of global liberal hegemony, you are the enemy. If you are against it, you are a friend. The first is inclined to accept this hegemony; the other is in revolt.

In light of recent events in Libya, what are your personal views on Gaddafi?

President Medvedev committed a real crime against Gaddafi and helped to initiate a chain of interventions in the Arab world. It was a real crime committed by our President. His hands are bloodied. He is a collaborator with the West. The crime of murdering Gaddafi was partly his responsibility. We Eurasianists defended Gaddafi, not because we were fans or supporters of him or his Green Book, but because it was a matter of principles. Behind the insurgency in Libya was Western hegemony, and it imposed bloody chaos. When Gaddafi fell, Western hegemony grew stronger. It was our defeat. But not the final one. This war has many episodes. We lost the battle, but not the war. And perhaps something different will emerge in Libya, because the situation is quite unstable. For example, the Iraq War actually strengthened Iran’s influence in the region, contrary to the designs of the Western hegemonists.

Given the situation in Syria at present, the scenario is repeating itself. However, the situation, with Putin returning to power, is much better. At least he is consistent in his support for President al-Assad. Perhaps this will not be enough to stop Western intervention in Syria. I suggest that Russia assist our ally more effectively by supplying weapons, financing, and so forth. The fall of Libya was a defeat for Russia. The fall of Syria will be yet another failure.

What is your opinion of, and relationship to Vladimir Putin?

He was much better than Yeltsin. He saved Russia from a complete crash in the 1990s. Russia was on the verge of disaster. Before Putin, Western-style liberals were in a position to dictate politics in Russia. Putin restored the sovereignty of the Russian state. That is the reason why I became his supporter. However, after 2003, Putin stopped his patriotic, Eurasianist reforms, putting aside the development of a genuine national strategy, and began to accommodate the economic liberals who wanted Russia to become a part of the project of globalization. As a result, he began to lose legitimacy, and so I became more and more critical of him. In some circumstances I worked with people around him to support him in some of his policies, while I opposed him in others. When Medvedev was chosen as his heir, it was a catastrophe, since the people positioned around him were all liberals. I was against Medvedev. I opposed him, in part, from the Eurasianist point-of-view. Now Putin will return. All the liberals are against him, and all the pro-Western forces are against him. But he himself has not yet made his attitude toward this clear. However, he is obliged to win the support of the Russian people anew. It is impossible to continue otherwise. He is in a critical situation, although he doesn’t seem to understand this. He is hesitating to choose the patriotic side. He thinks he can find support among some of the liberals, which is completely false. Nowadays, I am not so critical of him as I was before, but I think he is in a critical situation. If he continues to hesitate, he will fail. I recently published a book, Putin Versus Putin, because his greatest enemy is himself. Because he is hesitating, he is losing more and more popular support. The Russian people feel deceived by him. He may be a kind of authoritarian leader without authoritarian charisma. I’ve cooperated with him in some cases, and opposed him on others. I am in contact with him. But there are so many forces around him. The liberals and the Russian patriots around him are not so brilliant, intellectually speaking. Therefore, he is obliged to rely only upon himself and his intuition. But intuition cannot be the only source of political decision-making and strategy. When he returns to power, he will be pushed to return to his earlier anti-Western policies, because our society is anti-Western in nature. Russia has a long tradition of rebellion against foreign invaders, and of helping others who resist injustice, and the Russian people view the world through this lens. They will not be satisfied with a ruler who does not govern in keeping with this tradition.

Unthinking Liberalism: A. Dugin’s The Fourth Political Theory

Unthinking Liberalism:
Alexander Dugin’s The Fourth Political Theory

by Alex KURTAGIC

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Alexander Dugin
The Fourth Political Theory, London: Arktos, 2012

Arktos recently published what we can only hope will be the first of many more English translations of Alexander Dugin’s work. Head of the sociology department in Moscow State University, and a leading Eurasianist with ties to the Russian military, this man is, today, influencing official Kremlin policy.

The Fourth Political Theory is a thoroughly refreshing monograph, combining clarity of analysis, philosophical rigor, and intellectual creativity. It is Dugin’s attempt to sort through the confusion of modern political theory and establish the foundations for a political philosophy that will decisively challenge the dominant liberal paradigm. It is not, however, a new complete political theory, but rather the beginning of a project. The name is provisional, the theory under construction. Dugin sees this not as the work of one man, but, because difficult, a collective heroic effort.

The book first sets out the historical topology of modern political theories. In Dugin’s account, liberalism, the oldest and most stable ideology, was in modernity the first political theory. Marxism, a critique of liberalism via capitalism, was the second. Fascism/National Socialism, a critique of both liberalism and Marxism, was the third. Dugin says that Fascism/National Socialism was defeated by Marxism (1945), that Marxism was defeated by liberalism (1989), leaving liberalism triumphant and therefore free to expand around the globe.

According to Dugin, the triumph of liberalism has been so definitive, in fact, that in the West it has ceased to be political, or ideological, and become a taken-for-granted practice. Westerners think in liberal terms by default, assuming that no sane, rational, educated person could think differently, accusing dissenters of being ideological, without realizing that their own assumptions have ideological origins.

The definitive triumph of liberalism has also meant that it is now so fully identified with modernity that it is difficult to separate the two, whereas control of modernity was once contested by political theory number one against political theories two and three. The advent of postmodernity, however, has marked the complete exhaustion of liberalism. It has nothing new to say, so it is reduced endlessly to recycle and reiterate itself.

Looking to identify what may be useful to salvage, Dugin proceeds to break down each of the three ideologies into its component parts. In the process of doing so, he detoxifies the two discredited critiques of liberalism, which is necessary to be able to cannibalize them. His analysis of liberalism follows Alain de Benoist. Because it is crucial, I will avail myself of de Benoist’s insights and infuse some of my own in Dugin’s explication of liberalism.

Dugin says that liberalism’s historical subject is the individual. The idea behind liberalism was to “liberate” the individual from everything that was external to him (faith, tradition, authority). Out of this springs the rest: when you get rid of the transcendent, you end up with a world that is entirely rational and material. Happiness then becomes a question of material increase. This leads to productivism and economism, which, when the individual is paramount, demands capitalism. When you get rid of the transcendent, you also eliminate hierarchy: all men become equal. If all men are equal, then what applies to one must apply to all, which means universalism. Similarly, if all men are equal, then all deserve an equal slice of the pie, so full democracy, with universal suffrage, becomes the ideal form of government. Liberalism has since developed flavors, and the idea of liberation acquires two competing meanings: “freedom from,” which in America is embodied by libertarians and the Tea Party; and “freedom to,” embodied by Democrats.

Marxism’s historical subject is class. Marxism is concerned chiefly with critiquing the inequities arising from capitalism. Otherwise, it shares with liberalism an ethos of liberation, a materialist worldview, and an egalitarian morality.

Fascism’s historical subject is the state, and National Socialism’s race. Both critique Marxism’s and liberalism’s materialist worldview and egalitarian morality. Hence, the simultaneous application of hierarchy and socialism.

With all the parts laid out on the table, Dugin then selects what he finds useful and discards the rest. Unsurprisingly, Dugin finds nothing useful in liberalism. The idea is to unthink it, after all.

Spread out across several chapters, Dugin provides a typology of the different factions in the modern political landscape—e.g., fundamental conservatism (traditionalism), Left-wing conservatism (Strasserism, National Bolshevism, Niekisch), conservative revolution (Spengler, Jünger, Schmitt, Niekisch), New Left, National Communism, etc. It is essential that readers understand these so that they may easily recognize them, because doing so will clarify much and help them avoid the errors arising from opaque, confused, contradictory, or misleading labels.

Liberal conservatism is a key category in this typology. It may sound contradictory on the surface, because in colloquial discourse mainstream politics is about the opposition of liberals vs. conservatives. Yet, and as I have repeatedly stated, when one examines their fundamentals, so-called “conservatives” (a misleading label), even palaeoconservatives (another misleading label), are all ideologically liberals, only they wish to conserve liberalism, or go a little slower, or take a few steps back. Hence, the alternative designation for this type: “status-quo conservative.”

Another key category is National Communism. This is, according to Dugin, a unique phenomenon, and enjoys a healthy life in Latin America, suggesting it will be around for some time to come. Evo Morales and Hugo Chavez are contemporary practitioners of National Communism.

Setting out the suggested foundations of a fourth political ideology takes up the rest of Dugin’s book. Besides elements salvaged from earlier critiques of liberalism, Dugin also looks at the debris that in the philosophical contest for modernity was left in the periphery. These are the ideas for which none of the ideologies of modernity have had any use. For Dugin this is essential to an outsider, counter-propositional political theory. He does not state this in as many words, but it should be obvious that if we are to unthink liberalism, then liberalism should find its nemesis unthinkable.

But the process of construction begins, of course, with ontology. Dugin refers to Heidegger’s Dasein. Working from this concept he would like the fourth political theory to conceptualize the world as a pluriverse, with different peoples who have different moralities and even different conceptions of time. In other words, in the fourth political theory the idea of a universal history would be absurd, because time is conceived differently in different cultures—nothing is ahistorical or universal; everything is bound and specific. This would imply a morality of difference, something I have proposed as counter-propositional to the liberal morality of equality. In the last consequence, for Dugin there needs to be also a peculiar ontology of the future. The parts of The Fourth Political Theory dealing with these topics are the most challenging, requiring some grounding in philosophy, but, unsurprisingly, they are also where the pioneering work is being done.

Also pioneering, and presumably more difficult still, is Dugin’s call to “attack the individual.” By this he means, obviously, destabilizing the taken-for-granted construct that comprises the minimum social unit in liberalism—the discrete social atom that acts on the basis of rational self-interest, a construct that should be distinguished from “a man” or “a woman” or “a human.” Dugin makes some suggestions, but these seem nebulous and not very persuasive at this stage. Also, this seems quite a logical necessity within the framework of this project, but Dugin’s seeds will find barren soil in the West, where the individual is almost sacrosanct and where individualism results from what is possibly an evolved bias in Northern European societies, where this trait may have been more adaptive than elsewhere. A cataclysmic event may be required to open up the way for a redefinition of what it is to be a person. Evidently the idea is that the fourth political theory conceptualizes a man not as an “individual” but as something else, presumably as part of a collectivity. This is probably a very Russian way of looking at things.

The foregoing may all seem highly abstract, and I suspect practically minded readers will not take to it. It is hard to see how the abstract theorizing will satisfy the pragmatic Anglo-Saxon, who is suspicious of philosophy generally. (Jonathan Bowden was an oddity in this regard.) Yet there are real-world implications to the theory, and in Dugin’s work the geopolitical dimension must never be kept out of sight.

For Dugin, triumphant liberalism is embodied by Americanism; the United States, through its origins as an Enlightenment project, and through its superpower status in the twentieth and twenty-first century, is the global driver of liberal practice. As such, with the defeat of Marxism, it has created, and sought to perpetuate, a unipolar world defined by American, or Atlanticist, liberal hegemony. Russia has a long anti-Western, anti-liberal tradition, and for Dugin this planetary liberal hegemony is the enemy. Dugin would like the world to be multipolar, with Atlanticism counterbalanced by Eurasianism, and maybe other “isms.” In geopolitics, the need for a fourth political theory arises from a need to keep liberalism permanently challenged, confined to its native hemisphere, and, in a word, out of Russia.

While this dimension exists, and while there may be a certain anti-Americanism in Dugin’s work, Americans should not dismiss this book out of hand, because it is not anti-America. As Michael O’Meara has pointed out in relation to Yockey’s anti-Americanism, Americanism and America, or Americans, are different things and stand often in opposition. Engaging with this kind of oppositional thinking is, then, necessary for Americans. And the reason is this: liberalism served America well for two hundred years, but ideologies have a life-cycle like everything else, and liberalism has by now become hypertrophic and hypertelic; it is, in other words, killing America and, in particular, the European-descended presence in America.

If European-descended Americans are to save themselves, and to continue having a presence in the North American continent, rather than being subsumed by liberal egalitarianism and the consequent economic bankruptcy, Hispanization, and Africanization, the American identity, so tied up with liberalism because of the philosophical bases of its founding documents, would need to be re-imagined. Though admittedly difficult, the modern American identity must be understood as one that is possible out of many. Sources for a re-imagined identity may be found in the archaic substratum permeating the parts of American heritage that preceded systematic liberalism (the early colonial period) as well as in the parts that were, at least for a time, beyond it (the frontier and the Wild West). In other words, the most mystical and also the least “civilized” parts of American history. Yet even this may be problematic, since they were products of late “Faustian” civilization. A descent into barbarism may be in the cards. Only time will tell.

For Westerners in general, Dugin’s project may well prove too radical, even at this late stage in the game—contemplating it would seem first to necessitate a decisive rupture. Unless/until that happens, conservative prescriptions calling for a return to a previous state of affairs (in the West), or a closer reading of the founding documents (in America), will remain a feature of Western dissidence. In other words, even the dissidents will remain conservative restorationists of the classical ideas of the center, or the ideas that led to the center. Truly revolutionary thinking—the re-imagining and reinvention of ourselves—will, however, ultimately come from the periphery rather than the center.

 

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Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/09/unthinking-liberalism/

Aleksandr Dugin: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism, and the Fourth Political Theory

Aleksandr Dugin: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism, and the Fourth Political Theory

The Fourth Political Theory

 

Het boek wordt voorgesteld op 28 juli 2012 in Stockholm (voor Europa) en in Brazilië (voor het Amerikaanse continent).

 

 

Table of Contents:

A Note from the Editor
Foreword by Alain Soral
Introduction: To Be or Not to Be?

1. The Birth of the Concept
2. Dasein as an Actor
3. The Critique of Monotonic Processes
4. The Reversibility of Time
5. Global Transition and its Enemies
6. Conservatism and Postmodernity
7. ‘Civilisation’ as an Ideological Concept
8. The Transformation of the Left in the Twenty-first Century
9. Liberalism and Its Metamorphoses
10. The Ontology of the Future
11. The New Political Anthropology
12. Fourth Political Practice
13. Gender in the Fourth Political Theory
14. Against the Postmodern World
Appendix I: Political Post-Anthropology
Appendix II: The Metaphysics of Chaos

Civilization as political concept

Interview with the leader of the International “Eurasian Movement”, a philosopher, and a  professor at Moscow State University Alexander Dugin

Interviewed by the Global Revolutionary Alliance’s own Natella Speranskaja 

Ex: http://www.granews.info/

- The crisis of identity, with which we faced after the Cold War and the collapse of the communist world, is still relevant. What do you think is capable of lifting us out of this crisis  – a religious revival or creation of a new political ideology? Which of the options are you  inclined to yourself?

- After the collapse of communism came the phase of the “unipolar moment” (as Charles Krauthammer called it). In geopolitics, this meant the victory of unilateralism and Atlanticism, and because the pole was left alone, the West has become a global phenomenon. Accordingly,  the ideology of liberalism (or more accurately, neo-liberalism) is firmly in place crushing the two alternative political theories that existed in the twentieth century – communism and fascism . The Global liberal West has now defined culture, economics, information and technology, and politics. The West’s claims to the universalism of it’s values, the values of Western modernity and the Postmodern era, has reached its climax. 

Problems stemming from the West during the “unipolar moment” has led many to say that this “moment” is over, that he could not yet be a “destiny” of humanity.That is, a “unipolar moment” should be interpreted very broadly – not only geopolitical, but also ideologically, economically, axiologically, civilization wide. The crisis of identity, about which you ask, has scrapped all previous identities – civilizational, historical, national, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, in favor of a universal planetary Western-style identity  – with its concept of individualism, secularism, representative democracy, economic and political liberalism, cosmopolitanism and the ideology of human rights.Instead of a hierarchy of identities, which have traditionally played a large role in sets of collective identities, the “unipolar moment” affirmed a flat one-dimensional identity, with the absolutization of the individual singularity.  One individual = one identity, and any forms of the collective identity (for example, individual as the part of the religious community, nation, ethnic group, race, or even sex) underwent dismantling and overthrow. Hence the hatred of globalists for different kind of “majorities” and protection of minorities, up to the individual.

The Uni-polar Democracy of our moment - this is a democracy, which unambiguously protects the minority before the face of the majority and the individual before face of the group.  This is  the crisis of identity for those of non-Western or non-modern (or even not “postmodern”) societies,since this is where customary models are scrapped and liquidated. The postmodern West with  optimism, on the contrary, asserts individualism and hyper-liberalism in its space and zealously  exports it on the planetary scale.

However, it’s not painless, and has caused at all levels it’s own growing rejection.  The problems, which have  appeared in the West in the course of this “uni-polar moment”, forced many to speak, that this “moment’s” conclusion, has not succeeded in becoming “the fate” of humanity.  This, therefore,  was the cost of the  possibility of passage to some other paradigm…

So, we can think about an alternative  to the “unipolar moment” and, therefore, an alternative to liberalism, Americanism, Atlanticism, Western Postmodernism, globalization, individualism, etc. That is, we can, and I think should,  work out plans and strategies for a “post-uni polar world “, at all levels – the ideological and political, the economic, and religious, and the philosophical and geo-political, the cultural and civilizational, and technology, and value.

In fact, this is what I call multi-polarity. As in the case of uni-polarity it is not only about the political and strategic map of the world, but also the paradigmatic philosophical foundations of the future world order.  We can not exactly say that the “uni-polar moment” has finally been completed. No, it is still continuing, but it faces a growing number of problems. We must put an end to it – eradicate it. This is a global revolution, since the existing domination of the West, liberalism and globalism completely controls the  world oligarchy, financial and political elites.

So they just will not simply  give up their positions. We must prepare for a serious and intense battle.   Multi-polarity will be recaptured by the conquered peoples of the world in combat and it will be able to arise only on the smoking ruins of the global West.  While the West is still dictating his will to the rest, to talk about early multipolarity  – you must first destroy the Western domination on the ground.   Crisis – this is much, but far from all.

- If we accept the thesis of the paradigmatic transition from the current unipolar world order model to a new multi-polar model, where the actors are not nation-states, but  entire civilizations, can it be said that this move would entail a radical change in the very human identity?

- Yes, of course. With the end of the unipolar moment, we are entering a whole new world. And it is not simply a reverse or a step back, but it is a step forward to some unprecedented future, however, different from the digital project of “lonely crowds”, which is reserved for  humanity by globalism. Multi-polar identity will be the complex nonlinear collection of different identities – both individual and collective, that is varied for each civilization (or even inside each civilization).

This is something completely new that  will be created.

And the changes will be radical. We can not exclude that, along with known identities, civilizations, and offering of  new ways … It is possible that one of these new identities will become the identity of “Superman” – in the Nietzschean sense or otherwise (for example, traditionalist) …  In the “open society” of globalism the individual is, on the contrary, closedand strictly self-identical.

The multi-polar world’s anthropological map will be, however, extremely open, although the boundaries of civilizations  will be defined clearly. Man will again re-open the measurement of inner freedom – “freedom for”, in spite of the flat and purely external  liberal freedom – “freedom from” (as John Mill), Which is actually,  not freedom, but its simulacrum, imposed for a more efficient operation of the planetary masses by a small group of global oligarchs.

- Alexander Gelevich Dugin, you are the creator of the theory of a multi-polar world, which laid the foundation from which we can begin a new historical stage. Your book“The theory of a multi-polar world” has been and is being translated into other languages. The transition to a new model of world order means a radical change in the foreign policy of nation-states, and in today’s global economy, in fact, you have created all the prerequisites for the emergence of a new diplomatic language. Of course, this is a challenge of the global hegemony of the West. What do you think will be the reaction of your political opponents when they realize the seriousness of the threat posed?

- As always in the vanguard of  philosophical and ideological ideas, we first have the effect of bewilderment, the desire to silence or marginalize them. Then comes the phase of severe criticism and rejection. Then they begin to consider. Then they become commonplace and a truism. So it was with many of my ideas and concepts in the past 30 years. Traditionalism, geopolitics, Sociology of imagination , Ethnosociology, Conservative Revolution , National Bolshevism, Eurasianism, the Fourth Political Theory, National-structuralism, Russian Schmittianism, the concept of the three paradigms, the eschatological gnosis, New Metaphysics and Radical Theory of the Subject , Conspiracy theories, Russian haydeggerianstvo , a post-modern alternative , and so on – perceived first with hostility, then partially assimilated, and finally became part of mainstream discourse in academia and politics of Russia, and in part, and beyond.

Each of these directions has their fate, but the diagram of their mastering is approximately identical. So it will be also with the theory of a multipolar world   It will be hushed up, and then demonized and fiercely criticized, and then they will begin to look at it closely, and then accepted. But for all this it is necessary to pay for it and to defend it in the fight.  Arthur Rimbaud said that “the spiritual battle as fierce and hard, as the battle of armies.” For this we will have to struggle violently and desperately. As for everything else.

- In the “Theory of a multipolar world,” you write that in the dialogue between civilizations the responsibility is born by the elite of civilization. Do I understand correctly, it should be a “trained” elite, that is, the elite, which has a broad knowledge and capabilities, rather than the present “elite”? Tell me, what is the main difference between these elites?

- Civilizational elite – is a new concept. Thus far  it does not exist. It is a combination of two qualities – deep assimilation of the particular civilizational culture (in the philosophical, religious, value levels) and the presence of a high degree “of drive,” persistently pushing people to the heights of power, prestige and influence. Modern liberalism channels passion exclusively in the area of economics and business, creating a preference for a particular social elevator and it is a particular type of personality (which is an American sociologist Yuri Slezkine called “mercurial type”) .

The Mercurial elite of globalism, “aviakochevniki” mondialist nomadism, sung by Jacques Attali, should be overthrown in favor of radically different types of elites. Each civilization can dominate, and other “worlds”, not only thievish, mercurial shopkeepers and  cosmopolitans.  Islamic elite is clearly another – an example of this we see in today’s Iran, where the policy (Mars) and economics (Mercury) are subject to  spiritual authority, of the Ayatollah (Saturn).

But the “world” is only a metaphor. Different civilizations are based on different codes. The main thing is that the elite must be reflected in the codes themselves, whatever they may be. This is the most important condition. The will to power inherent in any elite, shall be interfaced with the will to knowledge, that is intellectualism and activism in such a multipolar elite should be wedded. Technological efficiency and value (often religious) content should be combined in such an elite. Only such an elite will be able to fully and responsibly participate in the dialogue of civilizations, embodying the principles of their traditions and engaging in interaction with other civilizations of the worlds.

- How can you comment on the hypothesis that the return to a bipolar model is still possible?

- I think not, practically or theoretically. In practice, because today there is no country that is comparable to the basic parameters of the U.S. and the West in general. The U.S. broke away from the rest of the world so that no one on its own can compete with them. Theoretically, only the West now has a claim to universality of its values, whereas previously Marxism was regarded as an alternative. After the collapse of the Soviet Union it became clear that universalism is only  liberal, capitalist. To resist Western imperialism there can only be a coalition of large spaces – not the second pole, but immediately multiple poles, each of them with its own strategic infrastructure and with a particular civilizational, cultural and ideological content.

- How real is the sudden transition to a non-polar model? What are the main disadvantages of this model?

- Passage to a non-polar model, about which leaders are increasingly talking of in the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard Haass, George Soros,etc.), means the replacement of the facade of a uni-polar hegemony, the transition from the domination based on military and strategic power of the United States and NATO (hardware ) to dispersed domination of the West as a whole (software). These are two versions – hard-hegemony and soft-hegemony. But in both cases the West, its civilization, its culture, its philosophy, its technologies, its political and economic institutes and procedures come out as the standard universal model.  Over the long term, this will indicate  the transfer of power to a “world government”, which will be dominated by all  the same Western elites, the global oligarchy. It will then  discard it’s  mask and will act directly on behalf of the transnational forces. In some sense non-polarity is worse than uni-polarity, though, it would seem hard to believe.

Non-polarity itself, and even more sharply and rapidly, will not yet begin. For this, the world must go through the turmoil and trials until a desperate humanity itself cried for the world elite with a prayer for salvation. Prior to that, to weaken the power of the United States, world disasters occur, and war. Non-polar world under the control of a world government, consisting of direct representatives of the global oligarchy,  is expected by many religious circles as the coming “of the kingdom of the Antichrist.”

As for the “shortcomings” of such a model, I believe that it is just  “a great parody of” the sacred world empire, which  Rene Guenon warned of in his work The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times. This will be a global simulacrum.  To recognize these “deficiencies” will  not be so easy, otherwise opposition “to the antichrist” would be too simple a matter, and the depth of his temptation would be insignificant.

The true alternative is a multi-polar world, everything else – evil in the truest sense of the word.

- The “counter-hegemony” by Robert Cox, who you mention in your book aims to expose the existing order in international relations and raise the rebellion against it. To do this, Cox called for the creation of counter-hegemonic bloc, which will include political actors who reject the existing hegemony. Have you developed the Fourth Political Theory as a kind of counter-hegemonic doctrine that could unite the rebels against the hegemony of the West?

- I am convinced that the Fourth Political Theory fits into the logic of building counter-hegemony, which Cox spoke of. By the way, also inthe proximity of critical theory in the MO theory, and multi-polar world is a wonderful text by Alexandra Bovdunova ,voiced at the Conference on the Theory of a multipolar world in Moscow, Moscow State University on 25-26 April 2012 .

4PT is not a complete doctrine, this is still the first steps toward the exit from the conceptual impasse in which we find ourselves in the face of liberalism, today rejected by more and more people around the world, in the collapse of the old anti-liberal political theories – Communism and Fascism. In a sense, the need for 4PT – is a sign of the times, and really can not be disputed by anyone. Another matter, what will be 4PT in its final form. The temptation appears to build it as a syncretic combination of elements of previous anti-liberal doctrines and ideologies …

I am convinced that we should go another way. It is necessary to understand the root of the current hegemony. This coincides with the root of modernity as such, and it grows from the roots of modernity in all three pillars of political theories – liberalism, communism and fascism. To manipulate them to find an alternative to modernity and liberalism, respectively, and of the liberal hegemony of the West, is in my view, pointless. We must move beyond modernity in general, beyond the range of its political actors – individual, class, nation, state, etc.

Therefore 4PT as the basis of a counter-hegemonic planetary front should be constructed quite differently. Like the theory of a multipolar world 4PT operates with a new concept – “civilization”, but 4PT puts special emphasis on the existential aspect of it. Hence the most important, the central thesis of 4PT that its subject is the actor -  Dasein. Every civilization, its Dasein, which means that it describes a specific set of existentials. On their basis, should be raised a new political theory  generalized at the following level into a “multipolar federation Of Dasein” as the concrete structure of counter – hegemony. In other words, the very counter-hegemony must be conceived existentially, as a field of war between the inauthentic globalization (global alienation) and the horizon of authentic  peoples and societies in a multipolar world (the possibility of overcoming the alienation  of civilizations).

- When we talk about cognitive uprising, however first of all, our actions should be aimed at the overthrow of the dictatorship of the West?

- The most important step is the beginning of the systematic preparation of a global revolutionary elite-oriented to multi-polarity 4PT. This elite must perform a critical function – to be a link between the local and global. At the local level we are talking about the masses and the clearest exponents of their local culture (religious leaders, philosophers, etc.). Often, these communities do not have a planetary perspective and simply defend their conservative identity before the onset of toxic globalization and Western imperialism.

Raising the masses and the traditionalist-conservatives  to a realized uprising in the context of a complex union of a counter-hegemonistic block is  extremely difficult. Simple conservatives and their supportive mass, for example, of the Islamic or Orthodox persuasion are unlikely to realize the necessity of  alliances with the Hindus or the Chinese. This will be the play  (and they are already actively playing it) of the globalists and their principle of “divide and conquer!” But the revolutionary elite, which is the elite, even within a particular traditionalist elite of society, should take the , heartfelt deep and deliberate feelings of local identity and correlate it within a total horizon of multi-polarity, and  4PT.

Without the formation of such a elite the revolt against the  post-modern world and the overthrow of the dictatorship of the West will not take place. Every time and everywhere   the West has a problem, he will come to the aid of anti-Western forces, which, however, will be motivated by narrow bills to specific civilizational neighbors – most often, just as anti-Western as they are. So it will be and already is the instrumentalization of globalists of various conservative fundamentalist and nationalist movements. Islamic fundamentalists to help the West is one. European nationalists – is another. So a “unipolar moment” extends not only to exist in itself, but also playing the antagonistic forces against him. The overthrow of the dictatorship of the West will become possible only if this strategy  will be sufficient enough to create or make appear a new counter-hegemonic elite. A initiative like Global Revolutionary Alliance – the unique example of really revolutionary and effective opposition to hegemony.

- You have repeatedly said that Eurasianism is a strategic, philosophical, cultural and civilizational choice. Can we hope that the political course chosen by Vladimir Putin (establishment of a Eurasian Union ) Is the first step towards a multipolar model?

- This is a difficult question. By himself, Putin and, especially, his environment, they act  more out of inertia, without calling into question the legitimacy of the existing planetary status quo. Their goal – to win his and Russia’s  rather appropriate place within the existing world order. But that is the problem: a truly acceptable place for Russia is not and can not exist, because the “uni-polar moment”, as well as the globalists stand for the desovereignization of Russia, eliminating it as an independent civilization, and strategic pole.

This self-destruction seems to suit, Dmitry Medvedev and his entourage (INSOR) for he was ready to reboot and go for almost all of it. Putin clearly understands the situation somewhat differently, and his criteria of “acceptability” is also different. He would most of all psychologically  arrange  a priority partnership with the West while maintaining the sovereignty of Russia. But this is  something  unacceptable under any circumstances to the unipolar globalists -  practically or theoretically.

So Putin is torn between multipolarity, where he leads the orientation of  sovereignty and Atlanticism, where he leads the inertia and the tireless work of a huge network of influence that permeates all of the structure of Russian society. Here’s the dilemma. Putin makes moves in both directions – he proclaims multi-polarity, the Eurasian Union, to protect the sovereignty of Russia, even spoke of the peculiarities of Russian civilization, strengthening vertical power, shows respect (if not more) to Orthodoxy, but on the other hand, surrounds himself with pro-American experts (eg, “Valdai Club”), rebuilds, education and culture under the globalistic Western models, has a liberal economic policy and suffers comprador oligarchs, etc.

The field for maneuver Putin is constantly shrinking. The logic of the circumstances pushes him to a more unambiguous choice. Inside the country this uncertainty of course causes growing hostility, and his legitimacy falls.

Outside the country  the West only increases the pressure on Putin to persuade him towards globalism and the recognition of “unilateralism”, specifically – to cede his post to the Westerner Medvedev. So Putin, while continuing to fluctuate between multipolarity and Westernism, loses ground and support here and there.

The new period of his presidency will be very difficult. We will do everything we can to move it to a multipolar world, the Eurasian Union and 4PT. But we are not alone in Russian politics – against us for influence in Putin’s circles we have an army of liberals, agents of Western influence and the staff of the global oligarchy. For us, though, we have the People and the Truth. But behind them – a global oligarchy, money, lies, and, apparently, the father of lies. Nevertheless, vincit omnia veritas. That I have no doubt.

Entretien avec Alexandre Douguine

Entretien avec Alexandre Douguine

Propos  recueillis  par le magazine allemand “Zuerst”

( http://www.zuerst.de )

Q.: Monsieur Douguine, la Russie subit un feu roulant de critiques occidentales, surtout depuis  la  réélection de Vladimir Poutine à la présidence  de la fédération de Russie. Les politiciens etl es médias prétendent que les élections ont été truquées, que Poutine n’est pas un démocrate et qu’il bafoue les “droits de l’Homme”...

AD: Vladimir Poutine, qu’on le veuille ou non, apprtient aux vrais grands sur la scène politique internationale. Pourtant, il faut dire que la  politique qu’il préconise est très spéciale, ce que bon nombre de politiciens et de médiacrates occidentaux ne sont apparemment pas capables de comprendre. D’une part, Poutine est un libéral, un homme politique résolument tourné vers l’Occident; d’autre part, il est un défenseur acharné de laa  souveraineté et de l’indépendance russes. C’est pourquoi il s’oppose de front aux Etats-Unis et à  leurs intérêts géopolitiques. Poutine est donc simultanément libéral-démocrate et souverainiste. Il est ensuite un réaliste politique absolu, une personnalité politique non fantasque. Poutine serait par voie de  conséquence  le partenaire idéal de tout pays occidental qui accorderait à la  souveraineté une valeur identitque et aussi élevée. Mais les pays  d’Occident ont abandonné depuis longtemps les valeurs du réalisme politique...

Q.: Que voulez-vous dire par là?

AD: Voyez-vous, ce que croit l’Occident aujourd’hui, c’est qu’un jour toutes  les démocraties libérales abandonneront leur souveraineté et se fonderont dans une sorte de “super-nation” sous l’hégémonie américaine. Telle est bien l’idée  centrale de la globalisation à l’oeuvre aujourd’hui. Ce projet est irréalisable avec un Vladimir Poutine car il s’y oppose et défend la souveraineté russe. Ensuite, il ne reconnaît pas la  prétention américaine à exercer cette hégémonie en toute exclusivité. C’est là qu’il faut chercher la vraie raison des attaques acharnées que commet l’Occident contre lui et de sa diabolisation. C’est aussi la  raison pour laquelle l’Occident soutient de manière aussi spectaculaire l’opposition russe: il s’agit d’acquérir de l’influence et de consolider l’hégémonie occidentale.

Q.: D’après vous donc, Poutine fait tout ce qu’il faut faire...

AD: Bien sûr que non. Il a commis  des erreurs, notamment lors des dernières élections pour le Parlement. Elles n’ont pas été aussi transparentes qu’elles auraient dû l’être.

Q.: La critique occidentale s’adresse surtout aux élections présidentielles...

AD: Pourtant, lors de ces élections-là, c’était le contraire: elles ont été parfaitement transparentes. La  grande  majorité des électeurs  soutient Poutine, voilà tout, même si l’Occident ne peut ni ne veut le comprendre. L’étranger ne soutient qu’une minorité pro-américaine, ultra-libérale et hostile à toute souveraineté russe, pour qu’elle s’attaque à Poutine. Tel est l’enjeu. Voyez-vous, Poutine peut être bon ou mauvais en politique intérieure, cela n’a pas d’importance pour l’Occident. La mobilisation de ses efforts pour maintenir l’idée de souveraineté  —et pas seulement la souveraineté russe—  et l’existence d’un monde  multipolaire fait qu’il est la cible de toutes les attaques occidentales.

Q.: L’Ukraine aussi subit désormais de lourdes attaques médiatiques en provenance de l’Occident. C’est surtout la détention de Ioulia Timochenko  que critiquent les médias. Est-ce que l’enjeu en Ukraine est le même qu’en Russie?

AD: La situation en Ukraine est complètement différente, même si les critiques occidentales visent également la souveraineté du pays.

Q.: Le président ukrainien Viktor Ianoukovitch est considéré par les agences médiatiques occidentales comme “pro-russe”...

AD: C’est pourtant faux. Ianoukovitch tente de maintenir un équilibre politique entre la  Russie et l’Union Européenne. Bien sûr, il n’estp as aussi pro-occidental que ne l’était Mme Timochenko. Ce qui dérange l’Occident, c’est que Ianoukovitch s’est à nouveau rapproché de la Russie. C’est contraire aux intérêts atlantistes. Ioulia Timochenko est aujourd’hui le symbole de ce que l’on a appelé  la “révolution orange”  —que l’Occident a soutenu matériellement et idéologiquement en Ukraine. C’est pour cette raison  que les forces atlantistes la considèrent comme une héroïne.

Q.: Ce que l’on critique surtout, ce sont les conditions de  détention de Ioulia Timochenko. On dit que ces conditions bafouent lourdement les règles convenues quant aux droits de l’Homme...

AD: L’Occident utilise les droits de l’Homme à tour de bras pour pouvoir exercer influence et chantage sur les gouvernements qui lui déplaisent. Si l’on parle vrai et que l’on dévoile sans détours ses plans hégémoniques et ses véritables intérêts politiques, on obtient moins de succès que si l’on adopte un langage indirect et que l’on évoque sans cesse les droits de l’Homme. Voilà ce qu’il faut toujours avoir en tête.

Q.: Vous venez d’évoquer la “révolution orange” qui a secoué l’Ukraine en 2004. Les protestations et manifestations contre Poutine à Moscou, il y a quelques mois et quelques semaines, ont-elles, elles aussi, été une nouvelle tentative de “révolution colorée”?

AD: Absolument.

Q.: Pourquoi ces manifestations se déroulent-elles  maintnenant et pourquoi cela ne s’est-il pas passé auparavant?

AD: Il me paraît très intéressant d’observer le “timing”. Il y a une explication très simple. Le Président Dmitri Medvedev est considéré en Occident comme une sorte de nouveau Gorbatchev. L’Occident avait espéré que Medvedev aurait introduit des réformes de nature ultra-libérales lors de son éventuel second mandat présidentiel et se serait rapproché des Etats-Unis et de l’UE. Mais quand Medvedev a déclaré qu’il laisserait sa place de président à Poutine et qu’il redeviendrait chef du gouvernement, la “révolution” a aussitôt commencé en Russie.

Q.: Les protestations et manifestations visaient cependant les fraudes supposées dans le scrutin et le manque de transparence lors des présidentielles...

AD: Non, ça, c’est une “dérivation”. Il s’agissait uniquement d’empêcher tout retour de Poutine à la présidence. Une fois de plus, bon nombre d’ONG et de groupes influencés par l’Occident sont entrés  dans la danse. Cela a permis d’accroître l’ampleur des manifestations, d’autant plus que certains déboires el a politique de Poutine ont pu être exploités. La politique de Poutine n’a pas vraiment connu le succès sur le plan social et il restait encore quelques sérieux problèmes de corruption dans son système. C’était concrètement les points faibles de sa politique. Mais répétons-le: la révolte contre Poutine a été et demeure inspirée et soutenue par l’étranger et n’a finalement pas grand chose à voir avec ces faiblesses politique: il s’agissait uniquement de barrer la  route au souverainisme qu’incarne Poutine.

Q.: D’après vous, Medvedev serait pro-occidental...

AD: La politique russe est plus compliquée qu’on ne l’imagine en Occident. Laissez-moi vous donner une explication simple: d’une  part, nous avons le souverainiste et le Realpolitiker Poutine, d’autre part, nous avons les “révolutionnaires (colorés)” et les atlantistes ultra-libéraux soutenus par l’Occident. Medvedev se situe entre les deux. Ensuite, les oligarques comme, par exemple, Boris Abramovitch Beresovski qui vit à Londres, jouent un rôle important aux côtés des révolutionnaires ultra-libéraux.

Q.: A ce propos, on ne fait qu’évoquer la figure de Mikhail Khodorkovski, sans cesse arrêté et emprisonné. Dans les médias occidentaux, il passe pour un martyr du libéralisme et de la démocratie. Comment jugez-vous cela?

AD: Il représente surtout le crime organisé en Russie. Dans un pays occidental, on n’imagine pas qu’un individu comme Khodorkovski ne se retrouverait pas aussi en prison. Il est tout aussi criminel que les autres oligarques qui ont amassé beaucoup d’argent en très peu de temps.

Q.: Et pourquoi les autres ne sont-ils pas en prison?

AD: C’est là que je critiquerai Poutine: les oligarques qui se montrent loyaux à son égard sont en liberté.

Q.: Quelle a été la faute de Khodorkovski?

AD: Khodorkovski n’a fait que soutenir les positions pro-occidentales, notamment quand il a plaidé pour un désarmement de grande envergure de l’armée russe. Il a soutenu les forces libérales et pro-occidentales en Russie. Pour Khodorkovski, le “désarmement” de la  Russie constituait une étape importante dans l’ouverture du pays au libéralisme et à l’occidentalisation. Il fallait troquer l’indépendance et la souveraineté contre un alignement sur les positions atlantistes. Alors qu’il était l’homme le plus riche de Russie, Khodorkovski a annoncé qu’il était en mesure d’acheter non seulement les parlements mais aussi les électeurs. Il est même allé plus  loin: il a fait pression sur Poutine pour faire vendre aux Américains la plus grosse entreprise pétrolière russe, “Ioukos”.

Q.: Khodorkovski était donc opposé à Poutine en bien des domaines?

AD: Effectivement. Khodorkovski a ouvertement déclaré la guerre à Poutine. Et Poutine a réagi, fait traduire l’oligarque en justice, où il a été condamné, non pas pour ses vues politiques mais pour les délits qu’il a commis. Pour l’Occident, Khodorkovski est bien entendu un héros. Parce qu’il s’est opposé à Poutine et parce qu’il voulait faire de la Russie une part du “Gros Occident”. Voilà pourquoi de nombreux gouvernements occidentaux, les agences médiatiques et les ONG prétendent que Khodorkovski est un “prisonnier politique”. C’est absurde et ridicule. Ce qui mérite la critique, en revanche, c’est que dans notre pays un grand nombre d’oligarques sont en liberté alors qu’ils ont commis les mêmes délits que Khodorkovski. Ils sont libres parce qu’ils n’ont pas agi contre Poutine. Voilà la véritable injustice et non pas l’emprisonnement que subit Khodorkovski.

Q.: Peut-on dire que, dans le cas de Khodorkovski, Poutine a, en quelque sorte, usé du “frein de secours”?

AD: Oui, on peut le dire. Avant que Khodorkovski ait eu la possibilité de livrer à l’étranger le contrôle des principales ressources de la Russie, Poutine l’a arrêté.

Q.: Vous  parlez de groupes et d’ONG pro-occidentaux qui soutiennent en Russie les adversaires de Poutine et qui, en Ukraine et aussi en Géorgie, ont soutenu les “révolutions colorées”. Qui se profile derrière ces organisations?

AD: Celui qui joue un rôle fort important dans toute cette agitation est le milliardaire américain Georges Soros qui, par l’intermédiaire de ses fondations, soutient à grande échelle les groupements pro-occidentaux en Russie; A Soros s’ajoutent d’autres fondations américaines comme par exemple “Freedom House” dont les activités sont financées à concurrence de 80% par des fonds provenant du gouvernement américain. “Freedom House” finance par exemple la diffusion de l’ouvrage de Gene Sharp, politologue américain auteur de “The Politics of non violent Action”, auquel se réfèrent directement les “révolutionnaires colorés” d’Ukraine. Beaucoup d’autres groupements et organisations sont partiellement financés par le gouvernement américain ou par des gouvernements européens en Russie ou dans des pays qui firent jadis partie de l’Union Soviétique. Nous avons affaire à un véritable réseau. Toutes les composantes de ce réseau sont unies autour d’un seul objectif: déstabiliser la Russie pour qu’à terme le pays deviennent une composante de la sphère occidentale.

Q.: Est-ce là une nouvelle forme de guerre?

AD: On peut parfaitement le penser. Les révolutions colorées représentent en effet une nouvelle forme des guerre contre les Etats souverains. Les attaques produisent des effets à tous les niveaux de la société. Dans cette nouvelle forme de guerre, on ne se pas pas en alignant et avançant des chars ou de l’artillerie mais en utilisant toutes les ressources des agences de propagande, en actionnant la pompe à finances et en manipulant des réseaux avec lesquels on tente de paralyser les centres de  décision de l’adversaire. Et l’une des armes les plus importantes dans le nouvel arsenal de  cette nouvelle forme de guerre, c’est la notion des “droits de l’Homme”.

Q.: Monsieur Douguine, nous vous remercions de nous avoir accordé cet entretien.

Zuerst Magazin: Interview mit Alexandr Dugin

Zuerst Magazin: Interview mit Alexandr Dugin

ex: http://www.zuerst.de/

Herr Dugin, Rußland wird seit Monaten mit einem Trommelfeuer westlicher Kritik überzogen – vor allem nach der Wiederwahl Wladimir Putins zum Präsidenten der Russischen Föderation. Politiker und Medien behaupten, die Wahlen seien gefälscht gewesen, Putin sei kein Demokrat und verletze die Menschenrechte…

Dugin: Wladimir Putin gehört wohl zu den wirklichen Größen in der internationalen Politik. Seine Politik ist zudem sehr speziell, das mögen viele Politiker und Journalisten im Westen vielleicht nicht verstehen. Einerseits handelt es sich bei Putin um einen liberalen, durchaus pro-westlichen Politiker, andererseits ist er ein starker Verfechter der russischen Souveränität und Unabhängigkeit. So tritt er gegenüber den USA und ihrer geopolitischen Interessen stark auf. Er ist also gleichzeitig liberal-demokratisch und souveränistisch. Putin ist zudem ein absoluter politischer Realist und kein Phantast. Putin wäre eigentlich der perfekte Partner für jedes westliche Land, welches sich ebenfalls der Souveränität einen so hohen Stellenwert einräumt. Aber der Westen hat längst dem politischen Realismus eine Absage erteilt.

Wie meinen Sie das?

Dugin: Sehen Sie, der Westen glaubt heute doch, daß alle liberalen Demokratien unter Aufgabe ihrer Souveränität zu einer Art Supernation unter US-Führung verschmelzen sollen. Das ist doch die Idee der Globalisierung. Doch das ist mit Wladimir Putin nicht zu machen, er wehrt sich dagegen und verteidigt die russische Souveränität. Zudem erkennt er nicht den Hegemonialanspruch der USA an. Das ist der wahre Grund, weshalb er aus dem Westen so scharf attackiert und dämonisiert wird. Und das ist auch der Grund, weshalb der Westen so massiv die Opposition in Rußland unterstützt – es geht um Einfluß und westliche Hegemonie.

Macht Putin also Ihrer Ansicht nach alles richtig?

Dugin: Natürlich nicht. Fehler wurden beispielsweise bei den vergangenen Parlamentswahlen gemacht. Diese waren nicht so transparent, wie sie hätten sein sollen und müssen.

Die westliche Kritik richtete sich aber vor allem auf die Präsidentenwahlen…

Dugin: Da war ja genau das Gegenteil der Fall: Diese Wahlen waren sehr transparent. Die große Mehrheit der Wähler unterstützt nun einmal Putin, auch wenn es der Westen nicht verstehen kann oder will. Nur eine Minderheit, die pro-amerikanisch, ultra-liberal und anti-souveränistisch eingestellt ist, wurde vom Ausland unterstützt, damit sie Putin angreift. Darum geht es. Sehen Sie, Putin kann in der Innenpolitik gut oder schlecht sein, das spielt für den Westen keine Rolle. Sein Eintreten für die Souveränität – und nicht nur für die von Rußland – sowie für eine multipolare Welt macht ihn zum Angriffsziel des Westens.

Auch die Ukraine ist schweren medialen Angriffen aus dem Westen ausgesetzt. Vor allem die Inhaftierung von Julia Timoschekow wird kritisiert. Geht es dort um die gleichen Dinge wie in Rußland?

Dugin: Die Situation in der Ukraine ist eine völlig andere, obgleich die Kritik aus dem Westen ebenfalls auf die Souveränität des Landes abzielt.

Der ukrainische Präsident Wiktor Janukowytsch gilt in den etablierten westlichen Medien als „pro-russisch“…

Dugin: Das ist aber falsch. Janukowytsch versucht das politische Gleichgewicht zwischen Rußland und der Europäischen Union zu halten. Natürlich ist er nicht so pro-westlich, wie es Timoschenkow war. Aber was den Westen stört, ist daß Janukowytsch sich wieder an Rußland angenähert hat. Das widerspricht den transatlantischen Interessen. Julia Timoschenkow hingegen ist heute ein Symbol für die sogenannte „Orangene Revolution“ – die vom Westen materiell und ideologisch unterstützt wurde - in der Ukraine. Im Westen gilt sie deswegen als Heldin.

Vor allem die Haftbedingungen von Julia Timoschenkow stehen in der Kritik. Es ist die Rede davon, daß diese einen schweren Verstoß gegen die Menschenrechte darstellen…

Dugin: Der Begriff der Menschenrechte wird vom Westen immer wieder gerne dafür genutzt, um auf mißliebige Regierungen Einfluß auszuüben. Spricht man über Hegemonie und Interessen, hat man für seine Politik weniger Unterstützung als wenn man über die Menschenrechte spricht. Das ist der Punkt.

Sie erwähnten die „Orangene Revolution“ in der Ukraine im Jahr 2004. Waren die Proteste und Demonstrationen gegen Putin in Moskau vor einigen Wochen ebenfalls ein Versuch einer solchen „Farbrevolution“?

Dugin: Absolut.

Warum erst jetzt und nicht schon früher?

Dugin: Das Timing ist sehr interessant. Und es gibt dafür eine sehr einfache Erklärung. Präsident Dmitri Medwedew wurde vom Westen als eine Art zweiter Gorbatschow betrachtet. Die Hoffnung des Westens war, daß Medwedew in einer zweiten Amtszeit als Präsident entscheidende ultra-liberale Reformen umsetzen würde und sich der EU und den USA annähern. Als aber Medwedew erklärte, er werde das Präsidentenamt für Putin freimachen und stattdessen wieder Regierungschef werden, war das der Start für die „Revolution“ in Rußland.

Die Proteste und Demonstrationen richteten sich doch angeblich gegen die mutmaßlichen Wahlfälschungen und gegen die fehlende Transparenz bei den Präsidentenwahlen…

Dugin: Nein, das ist Unsinn. Es ging einzig und allein darum, eine Rückkehr Wladimir Putin ins Präsidentenamt zu verhindern. Und wieder mischten dabei viele westlich beeinflußte Gruppen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen mit. Dabei wurde dieser Protest gegen Putin noch ausgeweitet, was durch die Mißerfolge Putins natürlich einfacher wurde. Er war vor allem in sozialen Belangen nicht sehr erfolgreich und es gibt nach wie vor große Probleme mit der Korruption im System Putins. Das sind tatsächliche Schwachpunkte seiner Politik. Aber nochmals: Die Revolte gegen Putin war und ist inspiriert und unterstützt von ausländischen Kräften und hat nichts mit diesen Schwachpunkten zu tun – es geht einzig und allein um Putins souveränistische Ausrichtung, die bekämpft werden soll.

Medwedew gilt als pro-westlich?

Dugin: Die russische Politik ist etwas komplizierter, als man im Westen allgemein annimmt. Lassen Sie es mich so erklären: Wir haben auf der einen Seite den Souveränisten und politischen Realisten Wladimir Putin, auf der anderen Seite sind die ultra-liberalen, vom Westen geförderten „Revolutionäre“ und Transatlantiker. Zwischen diesen beiden Positionen steht Medwedew. Übrigens spielen auch die Oligarchen wie beispielsweise Boris Abramowitsch Beresowski, der in London lebt, auf Seiten der ultra-liberalen Revolutionäre eine wichtige Rolle.

In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch immer wieder der inhaftierte Michail Chodorkowski genannt. In den westlichen Medien gilt er mittlerweile als eine Art liberaler, demokratischer Märtyrer. Wie sehen Sie das?

Dugin: Er steht für das organisierte Verbrechen in Rußland. Es ist kaum vorstellbar, daß ein Mann wie Chodorkowski in einem westlichen Land nicht in Haft säße. Er ist genauso kriminell wie die vielen anderen Oligarchen, die in sehr kurzer Zeit und sehr viel Geld gekommen sind.

Warum sitzen dann die anderen nicht im Gefängnis?

Dugin: Das ist wieder ein Kritikpunkt an Putin: Die Oligarchen, die ihm gegenüber loyal sind, sind auf freiem Fuß.

Was war Chodorkowskis Fehler?

Dugin: Chodorkowski machte sich zunehmend für pro-westliche Positionen stark, sprach sich unter anderem für eine starke Abrüstung der russischen Armee aus. Er unterstützte westlich-liberale Kräfte in Rußland. Für Chodorkowski war eine russische „Entwaffnung“ ein wichtiger Weg, das Land für die westlich-liberale Entwicklung zu öffnen. Unabhängigkeit und Souveränität sollten gegen eine größere Bindung an den Westen eingetauscht werden. Als reichster Mann Rußlands verkündete Chodorkowski sogar, er könne nicht nur Parlamente, sondern auch Wahlergebnisse kaufen. Chodorkowski ging sogar noch weiter: Er erpreßte Putin damit, daß er das größte Erdölunternehmen Rußlands „Jukos“ an die Amerikaner verkaufen würde.

Damit stand Chodorkowski also im Widerspruch zu Putin…

Dugin: Genau das ist der Punkt. Chodorkowski hat Putin quasi öffentlich den Krieg erklärt. Und Putin reagierte und ließ den Oligarchen vor Gericht stellen, wo er natürlich nicht wegen seiner politischen Ansichten, sondern wegen seiner Verbrechen verurteilt wurde. Für den Westen ist Chodorkowski natürlich ein Held. Denn er wollte es mit Putin aufnehmen und Rußland zum Teil des Westens machen. Daher behaupten nun verschiedene westliche Regierungen, Medien und NGOs, Chodorkowski sei ein politischer Häftling. Und genau das ist Unsinn. Kritik verdient aber die Tatsache, daß so viele andere Oligarchen bei uns noch immer frei herumlaufen, obwohl sie die gleichen Verbrechen begangen haben wie Chodorkowski. Diese sind nur deshalb frei, weil sie nicht gegen Putin agieren. Genau das ist die große Ungerechtigkeit und nicht die Haftstrafe Chodorkowskis.

Hat Putin bei Chodorkowskis sozusagen die Notbremse gezogen?

Dugin: Genau so kann man das sagen. Bevor Chodorkowskis die Möglichkeit hatte, die Kontrolle der wichtigsten Ressourcen Rußlands an das Ausland zu vergeben, hat ihn Putin gestoppt.

Sie sprechen von den pro-westlichen Gruppen und NGOs, die in Rußland die Putin-Gegner unterstützen und in der Ukraine, aber auch in Georgien die „bunten Revolutionen“ unterstützt haben. Wer steht hinter diesen Organisationen?

Dugin: Eine wichtige Rolle spielt hierbei der US-Milliardär George Soros, der über seine Stiftungen pro-westliche Gruppen in Rußland massiv unterstützt. Dazu kommen andere US-Stiftungen, wie beispielsweise „Freedom House“, die ihrerseits mit etwa 80 Prozent mit Geldern der US-Regierung finanziert wird. „Freedom House“ sorgt für die Verbreitung der Schrift The Politics of Nonviolent Action des US-Politologen Gene Sharp, auf die sich die Revolutionäre in der Ukraine explizit berufen. Viele andere Gruppen und Organisationen, teilweise direkt von der US-Regierung oder den europäischen Regierungen finanziert, engagieren sich in Rußland und in den Ländern der ehemaligen Sowjetunion. Es gibt es regelrechtes Netzwerk. Sie alle eint ein Ziel: die Destabilisierung Rußlands, damit das Land ein Teil des westlichen Systems wird.

Ist das eine neue Form des Krieges?

Dugin: So kann man das betrachten. Die bunten Revolutionen sind eine neue Form des Krieges gegen souveräne Staaten. Die Angriffe wirken auf allen Ebenen der Gesellschaft. In diesem neuen Krieg kämpft man nicht mit Kanonen, sondern mit Propaganda, Geld und weit verzweigten Netzwerken, mit denen man versucht, die Entscheidungszentren des Gegners lahmzulegen. Eine der wichtigsten Waffen dieses neuen Krieges ist der Begriff der „Menschenrechte“.

Herr Dugin, vielen Dank für das Gespräch.

Julius Evola e o Tradicionalismo Russo

Julius Evola

e o Tradicionalismo Russo

 por Aleksandr Dugin

Ex: http://legio-victrix.blogspot.com/

1) A Descoberta de Evola na Rússia

Os trabalhos de Julius Evola foram descobertos nos anos 60 pelo grupo de intelectuais esotéricos e anti-comunistas conhecidos como “os dissidentes da direita”. Eles compunham um pequeno círculo de pessoas que conscientemente se negavam a participar da “vida cultural” da URSS e que, ao invés disso, tinham escolhido uma vida subterânea para si. A disparidade entre o cultura Soviética presente e a verdadeira realidade Soviética foi quase que totalmente o motivo que os levou a buscar os princípios fundamentais que poderiam explicar as origens daquela terrível idéia absolutista. Foi pela sua recusa do Comunismo que eles descobriram certos trabalhos de autores anti-modernos e tradicionalistas: acima de tudo, os livros de Rene Guenon e Julius Evola. Duas personalidades centrais animavam este grupo – o filósofo islâmico Geidar Djemal e o poeta não-conformista Eugene Golovine. Graças a eles, esses “dissidents da direita” souberam os nomes e as idéias do dois maiores tradicionalistas do século. Nos anos 70, uma das primeiras traduções de um trabalho de Evola (A Tradição Hermética) apareceu e foi distribuída dentro de um grupo, de acordo com os métodos do Samizdat [1]. No entanto, as traduções originais eram particularmente ruins em qualidade, porque elas foram feitas por amadores incompetentes muito distantes do grupo de verdadeiros intelectuais tradicionalistas.

Em 1981, uma tradução do Heidnische Imperialismus apareceu de maneira similar, como o único livro desse tipo disponível na Livraria Lenin em Moscow. Desta vez, a distribuição pelo Samizdathavia se tornado muito maior e a qualidade da tradução era muito melhor. Pouco a pouco eles distanciaram a verdadeira corrente tradicionalista do anti-comunismo, e a aproximaram do anti-modernismo, extendendo a sua negação da existência Soviética para a rejeição do mundo moderno, de maneira muito próxima à visão tradicionalista integral. Deve notar-se que as idéias tradicionalistas em questão, neste ponto particular, foram completamente removidas dos outros grupos de “dissidentes da direita”, que geralmente eram Cristãos ortodoxos, monarquistas e nacionalistas. Nesta época, Evola era mais popular entre aqueles interessados no espiritualismo em sentido amplo: praticantes de yoga, teosofistas [2], psiquistas [3], e daí em diante.

Durante a Perestroika, todos os tipos de dissidência anti-comunista se manifestaram e dos “dissidentes da direita” vieram as ideologias políticas e culturais da Direita atual: nacionalistas, nostálgicos, anti-liberais e anti-Ocidentais. Neste contexto e depois do desenvolvimente de idéias estritamente tradicionalistas, como resultado do Glasnost, os nomes de Guenon e Evola foram introduzidos no conjunto cultural russo. Os primeiros trabalhos de Evola apareceram nos anos 90, nas amplamente lidas partes da mídia conhecidamente “patriótica” ou “conservadora” e o assunto do tradicionalismo tornou-se tema de virulentas polêmicas e era um assunto importante para a Direita Russa como um todo. Periódicos como Elementy, Nach Sovremennik, Mily Anguel, Den, etc, começaram a publicar fragmentos dos escritos de Evolas, ou artigos inspirados nele, ou em que seu nome e citações apareciam.Pouco a pouco o campo “conservador” veio a ter uma estrutura ideológica que produziu cisões entre os velhos nostáligcos e monarquistas da Direita e os mais abertos não conformistas e participantes da Direita menos ortodoxa (algumas vezes chamados de “novye pravye”, em russo, pode-se estar inclinado a fazer um paralelo com a “nouvelle droite”, mas foi um fenômeno bem diferente como um todo em relação com a ND européia). Pode-se categorizar este segundo grupo de patriotas como sendo parte da “Terceira Via” ou “Nacional-Revolucionários” e por aí em diante. O ponto de separação se dá exatamente sobre a aceitação ou rejeição da idéias de Evola, ou talvez mais apropriadamente, da idéias de Evola que não poderiam ser consideradas naturalmente “conservadoras” ou “reacionárias”, como a idéia de “Revolução Conservadora” e de “Revolta Contra o Mundo Moderno”.

Recentemente, o primeiro livro “Heidnische Imperialismus” teve 50.000 cópias publicadas. Até mesmo um programa de televisão voltado a Evola foi feito por uma canal popular. Então, pode-se ver que a descoberta de Evola pela Rússia foi feita em uma escala bastante ampla. Ele, que uma vez constitui o núcleo intelectual hiper-marginal da Rússia, antes da Perestroika, se tornou agora um fenômeno político e ideológico considerável. Mas é bem claro que Evola escreveu seus livros e formulou suas idéias num contexto temporal, cultural, histórico e étnico bem diferente. Isso, então, torna-se um problema: quais partes da filosofia de Evola são relevantes para a Rússia moderna e quais partes precisam ser trabalhadas, melhoradas ou mesmo rejeitadas, nessas circunstâncias? Esta pergunta necessita de uma rápida análise comparando e contrastando o tradicionalismo sagrado de Evola e o fenômeno político estritamente russo.


2) Contra o Ocidente Moderno

Desde o começo, se torna óbvio que a rejeição do mundo mercenário profano moderno, manifestado na Civilização Ocidental durante os últimos séculos, é comum tanto para Evola quanto para a totalidade da tradição intelectual da Eslavofilia Russa. Autores russos como Homyakov, Kirievsky, Aksakov, Leontiev e Danilevsky (entre os filósofos), assim como Dostoevsky, Gogol e Merejkovsky (entre os romancistas), criticaram o mundo Ocidental quase na mesma linguagem em que o fez Evola. Pode-se observar que todos eles possuiam o mesmo ódio pelo governo dos mafiosos, ou seja, o sistema democrático moderno, e que eles consideravam este sistema como degradação espiritual e profanação total. Similarmente, pode-se observar o mesmo diagnóstico para essas doenças do mundo moderno - a Franco-Maçonaria Profana, o judaismo depravado, o avanço da plebe, a deificação da “razão” – em Evola e na cultura “conservadora” russa. Obviamente, a tendência reacionária aqui é comum a ambos, então a crítica de Evola do Ocidente está totalmente de acordo com, e é aceitável para a linha de pensamentos do conservadorismo russo.

Mais freqüentemente do que não [freqüentemente], pode-se ver que as críticas de Evola estão mais proximamente relacionadas com a mentalidade russa do que com uma mais amplamente européia – o mesmo tipo de generalização, a invocação freqüente de objetivos mitológicos e místicos, a noção distinta de que o mundo espiritual interno é organicamente separado das realidades imediatas modernas da perversão e do desvio. Em geral, a tradição conservadora russa de hodiernamente explicar eventos históricos num sentido mitológico, é de alguma forma, obrigatória. O apelo ao sobrenatural/irracional, aqui, está em perfeita congruência com o pensamento russo, que faz da explicação racional a exceção, e não a regra.

Pode-se notar a influência que os conservadores russos exeerceram em Evola: nos seus trabalhos ele freqüentemente cita Dostoevsky, Merejkovsky (quem ele conhecia pessoalmente) e muitos outros autores russos. Na outra mão, as frequëntes referências que ele faz à Malynsky e Leon de Poncins carregam parcialmente a tradição contra-revolucionária tão típica do Ser europeu. Pode-se citar também as referências que ele faz a Serge Nilus, o compilador do famoso “Protocolos dos Sábios de Sião”, que Evola reeditou na Itália.

Ao mesmo tempo, fica claro que Evola conhecia relativamente pouco sobre os meios conservadores russos, e, de fato, ele nem mesmo estava particularmente interessado neles, devido à sua idiossincrasia anti-cristã. A respeito da tradição Ortodoxa ele fez apenas alguns insignificantes comentários. Mesmo assim, a semelhança entre a sua posição sobre a crise do mundo moderno e o anti-modernismo do autores russos é dada, amplamente, pela comunidade de reações orgânicas – Grandes Homens e “indivíduos”, no caso de Evola e heróis, no caso dos russos. Mas graças à espontaneidade das convergências anti-modernas, a gravidade dos desacordos de Evola, se tornam muito mais interessantes e muito mais críticos.

Em qualquer nível, as interpretações de Evola se encaixam perfeitamente no quadro de ideologia moderna da “novye pravye”, [isso ocorre] tão amplamente, que ela [novye pravye] agrega mais à sua visão da degradação da modernidade, aplicando, algumas vezes, as suas idéias [de Evola] mais globalmente, mais radicalmente e mais profundamente. Deste modo, as teorias de Evola são muito bem aceitas na Rússia moderna, onde o anti-Ocidentalismo é um fator político-ideológico extremamente potente. 

3) Roma e a Terceira Roma

Um aspecto particular do pensamento de Evola é sentido pelos russos como de uma extrema e iminente importância: sua exaltação do Ideal Imperial. Roma representa o ponto principal da visão-de-mundo de Evola. Este poder sagrado vivente, que se manifestou por todo o Império era, para Evola, a própria essência da herança do Ocidente tradicional. Para Evola, as ruínas do Palácio de Nero e dos prédios romanos eram como um testamento direto de uma santidade orgânica e física, da qual a integridade e continuaidade fora aniquilada pelo “castelo” kafkiano [4] do Vaticano Católico Guelfo.

A sua linha de pensamento Guibelina era clara: Imperium contra a Igreja, Roma contra o vaticano, a sacralidade iminente e orgânica contra as abstrações sentimentais e devocionais da fé, implicitamente dualista e Farisaica[5].

Mas uma linha de pensamento similar, aparentemente, é naturalmente sentida pelos russos, de quem o destino histórico sempre esteve profundamente ligado ao [Ideal] do Imperium. Esta noção estava dogmaticamente enraizada na concepção Ortodoxa da filosofia staret[6] – “Moscow: A Terceira Roma” – Deve-se tomar nota que a “Primeira Roma” nesta interpretação cíclica Ortodoxa não era a Roma Cristã, mas a Roma Imperial, porque a “Segunda Roma” (ou “a Nova Roma”) era Constantinopla, a capital do Império Cristão. Então a mesma idéia de “Roma” mantida pelos Ortodoxos Russos, corresponde ao entendimento de sacralidade como a importância daquilo que é Sagrado e assim, a necessária e inseparável “sinfonía” entre autoridade espiritual e o reino temporal. Para a ortodoxia tradicional, a separação católica entre o Rei e o Papa é inimaginável e beira a blasfêmia, este conceito é até mesmo chamado de “heresia Latina”.

Mais uma vez, pode-se ver a perfeita convergência entre o dogma de Evola e o pensamento comum da mentalidade conservadora russa. E outra vez mais, a clara exaltação espiritual do Imperium nos livros de Evola, é de inestimável valor para os russos, pois isto é o que eles veem como a sua verdadeira identidade tradicional. O “imperialismo sinfônico”, ou melhor, “Imperialismo Guibelino”.

Existe um outro detalhe importante que merece ser mencionado aqui. É sabido que o “Autor do Terceiro Reich” Artur Müller van den Bruck, foi profundamente influenciado pelos escritos de Fiodor Dostoievsky, para quem o conceito de “Terceira Roma” era vitalmente significativo. Pode-se ver mesma visão escatológica de van den Bruck do “Último Império”, nascido da convergência metafórica entre as idéias dos montanistas paracléticos[7] e as profecias de Joachim de Flora[8].

Van den Bruck, de quem as idéias eram algumas vezes citadas por Evola, adaptou o seu conceito de “Terceira Roma” da tradição Ortodoxa russa, e aplicou na Alemanha, onde ele foi ulteriormente trabalhado espiritual e socialmente pelos Nacional-Socialistas. Um fato interessante é que Erich Müller, o protegé de Nikisch[9], que fora grandemente inspirado por van den Bruck, comentou certa vez que o Primeiro Reich havia sido Católico[10], o Segundo Reich, Protestante[11], o Terceiro Reich deveria ser, exatamente, Ortodoxo!

Mas o próprio Evola participou amplamente nos debates intelectuais dos círculos revoluionários-conservadores alemães (ele era membro do “Herrenklub” de von Gleichen, que era a continuação do “Juniklub” fundado por van den Bruck), onde assuntos similares eram discutidos de uma maneira muito vívida. Agora é fácil ver outra maneira em que a mentalidade conservadora russa está ligada às teorias de Evola. Obviamente, não é possível dizer que as suas idéias, nesses problemas particulares, eram idênticas, mas ao mesmo tempo, existem conexões extraordinárias entre os dois que podem ajudar a explicar a assimilação das idéias de Evola para a mentalidade russa, que possui visões muito menos “extravagantes” do que aquelas pertencentes à Europa Conservadora Tradicional, que é majoritariamente Católica e Nacionalista nos dias de hoje, e raramente Imperialista.

***

[1] Samizdat foi um sistema na antiga URSS em que os livros oficialmente “impermissíveis” circulavam pelo país; estes eram cópias de cópias e não tinham boa qualidade, mas eles tendiam a chegar ao seu objetivo.

[2] Um escola religiosa/filosófica fundada pela ocultista russa Helena Blavatsky.

[3] Um conceito teosófico relacionado à todos os fenômenos mentais; C.G. Jung também o discutiu ocasinalmente.

[4] Para aqueles que não estão familiarizados com o trabalho de Kafka, esta é uma referência para o seu livro chamado “O Castelo”, que é sobre um homem que contrai o que deveria ser uma trabalho relativamente fácil num lugar distante, fazendo o levantamento das terras de um nobre local, mas que não consegue começar ou muito menos completar o seu trabalho, devido à burocracia imposta pelo seu próprio empregador (que ele nunca conhece pessoalmente, apenas por um representante ou representante de um representante) e que se frustra muito pelo fato de que o imenso e opressivo castelo do Conde pode ser visto de qualquer parte da cidade, mas ele não consegue nunca ir até lá para começar a sua tarefa. Obviamente, esta é uma acusação metafórica contra a totalidade do sistema judaico-cristão e como ele se relaciona com uma aparentemente impossível salvação. Da mesma forma, “Guelfo” se refere à uma coalisão alemã/italiana da Idade Média que apoiava a casa real de Guelfo contra a Dinastia Imperial Alemã dos Guibelinos, que era hostil ao Papa e ao Catolicismo.

[5] Referete aos Fariseus, hipocrisia, duplicidade, falsidade, fingimento.

[6] Os starets eram conselheiros espirituais, mas não sacerdotes: Rasputin poderia ser considerado como um.

[7] Os montanistas foram os precursors das seitas pentecostais modernas, i.e., aqueles que acreditam em revelações divinas pessoais e falar em linguas diferentes.

[8] de Flora era o Abade de Corazzo que completou um ensaio bastante presciente sobre a “era da razão”, por volta de 1200, onde ele escreveu “no novo dia, homens não dependerão da fé, porque tudo será fundamentado no conhecimento e na razão.”

[9] Ernst Nikisch, um nacionalista alemão da mesma época.

[10] o Sacro Império Romano-Germânico

[11] a Prússia sob o governo de Frederico, o Grande

Alexandree Douguine sur "Méridien Zéro"

Alexandre Douguine

sur "Méridien Zéro" (Paris)

Alexander Dugin: "The Apparent and the Unbelievable" + "Pure Satanism"

"The Apparent and the Unbelievable": Alexander Dugin and Sergei Kapitsa (English subtitles) Part I

Dugin and Kapitsa 2 (Complete)



"Pure Satanism": Alexander Dugin on Postmodernity in Western Society

Traditionalism and Dugin, in Russian

Traditionalism and Dugin, in Russian

There is a new article in Russian on Dugin by Andreas Umland and Anton Shekhovtsov, "Philosophia Perennis и «неоевразийство»: роль интегрального традиционализма в утопических построениях Александра Дугина" (Philosophia Perennis and 'Neo-Eurasianism:' The Role of Integral Traditionalism in the Utopian Constructions of Aleksandr Dugin), in Форум новейшей восточноевропейской истории и культуры - Русское издание 2 (2010), available at http://www1.ku-eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/inhaltruss14.html. This is a translation of Anton Shekhovtsov and Andreas Umland, "Is Aleksandr Dugin a Traditionalist? 'Neo-Eurasianism' and Perennial Philosophy" The Russian Review 68 (October 2009), pp. 662–78, discussed in a previous post.

Geopolitica della Romania

Aleksander G. Dughin:

Geopolitica della Romania

1. I geni romeni e l’identità romena


La Romania ha dato al mondo, specialmente nel XX secolo, tutta una pleiade di geni di livello mondiale : Nae Ionescu, Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, Eugen Ionescu, Ştefan Lupaşcu, Jean Pârvulescu, Vasile Lovinescu, Mihail Vâlsan e molti altri.

Per quanto sia un piccolo Paese dell’Est europeo, sul piano intellettuale la Romania ha dato un contributo significativo alla civiltà, paragonabile a quello delle grandi nazioni europee e per poco non le ha superate. L’intellettualità romena ha di caratteristico che essa riflette lo spirito del pensiero europeo ed è indissolubilmente legata allo spirito tradizionale, traendo le proprie origini dalla terra e affondando le proprie radici nell’Antichità e in nell’Ortodossia di un immutato Oriente europeo.

Nel suo saggio su Mircea Eliade e l’unità dell’Eurasia, riferendosi alla natura eurasiatica della cultura romena, Claudio Mutti cita Eliade : « Mi sentivo il discendente e l’erede di una cultura interessante perché situata fra due mondi : quello occidentale, puramente europeo, e quello orientale. Partecipavo di questi due universi. Occidentale per via della lingua, latina, e per via del retaggio romano, nei costumi. Ma partecipavo anche di una cultura influenzata dall’Oriente e radicata nel neolitico. Ciò è vero per un Romeno, ma sono sicuro che sia lo stesso per un Bulgaro, un Serbo-Croato – insomma per i Balcani, l’Europa del Sud-Est – e per una parte della Russia » (M. Eliade, L’épreuve du Labyrinthe. Entretiens avec Claude-Henri Rocquet, Pierre Belfond, Paris 1978, pp. 26-27).

L’identità romena presenta una simbiosi tra vettori di civiltà orientali e occidentali, senza che gli uni prevalgano sugli altri. In ciò consiste l’unicità della Romania come società e come territorio e dei Romeni come popolo. La Romania e i Romeni si sono trovati divisi tra gl’imperi dell’Oriente (l’impero ottomano) e dell’Occidente (l’impero austro-ungarico), appartenendo alla chiesa ortodossa di rito bizantino e alla famiglia dei popoli di lingua neolatina.

Per gli eurasiatisti russi, questo è solo uno dei punti di approccio possibili, poiché essi prendono in considerazione una combinazione di coordinate occidentali ed orientali nella cultura e nella storia russa, dichiarando una specifica identità del popolo russo e dello Stato russo.

Quindi, nel quadro del dialogo culturale romeno-russo dovrebbe esser considerata la dottrina dell’eurasiatismo, la quale è autonoma, però, grazie alle varietà e alle proporzioni di cui essa dispone, ci offre una solida base per un mutuo approccio, ed una comprensione e un’amicizia reciproche.

Perciò la traduzione in romeno del libro I fondamenti della geopolitica, che contiene il programma della scuola geopolitica russa dell’eurasiatismo, può essere considerata un’opera di riferimento. Confido nel fatto che i Romeni, entrando in familiarità con la dottrina geopolitica dell’eurasiatismo di scuola russa, comprendano il paradigma del pensiero e dell’azione di Mosca sia in relazione al passato, sia in relazione al presente.

1. La Romania e la struttura delle opzioni geopolitiche (euroatlantismo ed eurocontinentalismo)


Adesso, alcune parole sulla geopolitica della Romania. Nelle condizioni attuali, l’espressione « geopolitica della Romania » non è molto appropriata, se prendiamo in considerazione la Romania come soggetto di geopolitica. Nell’architettura del mondo contemporaneo un soggetto del genere non esiste. Ciò è dovuto alla logica della globalizzazione, nella quale il problema si presenta in questi termini : o ci sarà un solo « Stato mondiale » (world state), con un governo mondiale guidato e dominato direttamente dall’ « Occidente ricco », in primo luogo dagli USA, oppure si stabilirà un equilibrio tra i « grandi spazi » (Grossraum) dei « nuovi imperi », i quali integreranno quelli che finora abbiamo conosciuto come « Stati nazionali ». Nel nostro mondo, o si passerà dagli Stati nazione sovrani (come nell’Europa tra il XVI e il XX secolo) al governo mondiale (mondo unipolare) o avrà luogo il passaggio verso un nuovo impero (mondo multipolare).

In entrambi i casi, la dimensione della Romania come Stato non ci consente di dire – nemmeno in teoria – che la Romania possa diventare un « polo » ; perfino la Russia, col suo potenziale nucleare, le sue risorsde naturali e il suo messianismo storico, si trova in una situazione analoga.

In tali condizioni, la « geopolitica della Romania » costituisce una sezione della « geopolitica dell’Europa unita ». Questo non è soltanto un dato politico attuale, essendo la Romania un Paese membro dell’Unione Europea, ma è un fatto inevitabilmente connesso alla sua situazione geopolitica. Anzi, la stessa « geopolitica dell’Europa unita » non è qualcosa di garantito e sicuro. Perfino l’Europa presa nel suo insieme, l’Unione Europea, può basare la sua sovranità solo su un mondo multipolare ; solo in un caso del genere l’Europa sarà sovrana, sicché la Romania, in quanto parte dell’Europa, beneficierà anch’essa della sovranità. L’adozione del modello americano unipolare di dominio, che rifiuta all’Europa la sovranità, coinvolge anche la Romania in quanto parte dell’Europa.

Perciò la familiarità con le questioni geopolitiche non è qualcosa di necessario e vitale, ma l’argomento va preso in considerazione quando si tratta di allargare l’orizzonte intellettuale.

In verità, se prendiamo in considerazione quello che abbiamo detto più sopra ikn relazione al contributo dei Romeni alla scienza ed alla cultura dell’Europa, la geopolitica potrebbe essere una base molto importante per determinare il ruolo e le funzioni della Romania nel contesto europeo. Non è quindi casuale il fatto che le prospettive geopolitiche occupino una parte significativa nei romanzi di quell’Europeo esemplare che  stato l’eccellente scrittore franco-romeno Jean Pârvulescu, saggista, poeta e pensatore profondo.

Il dilemma della geopolitica europea può essere ricondotto a una scelta fra l’euroatlantismo (riconoscimento della dipendenza da Washington) e l’eurocontinentalismo. Nel primo caso l’Europa rinuncia alla sua sovranità in favore del « fratello maggiore » oltremarino, mentre nel secondo caso essa insiste sulla propria sovranità (fino a organizzare un modello geopolitico e geostrategico proprio). Questa opzione non è completamente definita e sul piano teorico dipende da ciascuno dei Paesi dell’Unione Europea, quindi anche dalla Romania. Per questo motivo, che ha a che fare con la geopolitica della Romania nel senso stretto del termine, nel contesto attuale si rende necessaria una partecipazione consapevole e attiva nella scelta del futuro dell’Europa : dipendenza o indipendenza,  vassallaggio o sovranità, atlantismo o continentalismo.

Una geopolitica del « cordone sanitario »

Nella questione dell’identità geopolitica dell’Europa è possibile individuare il modello seguente : ci sono i Paesi della « Nuova Europa » (New Europe), paesi est-europei che tendono ad assumere posizioni russofobiche dure, aderendo in tal modo all’orientamento euroatlantico, delimitandosi ed estraniandosi dalle attuali tendenze continentali della Vecchia Europa, in primo luogo la Francia e la Germania (la Gran Bretagna è tradizionalmente alleata degli USA).

Questa situazione ha una lunga storia. L’Europa dell’Est è stata continuamente una zona di controversie tra Europa e Russia : ne abbiamo un esempio tra il secolo XIX e l’inizio del secolo XX, quando la Gran Bretagna usò deliberatamente questa regione come un « cordone sanitario » per prevenire una possibile alleanza tra la Russia e la Germania, alleanza che avrebbe posto fine al dominio anglosassone sul mondo. Oggi si verifica ancora la stessa cosa, con la sola differenza che adesso viene messo l’accento sui progetti energetici e nei Paesi del « cordone sanitario » si fa valere l’argomento secondo cui si tratterebbe anche di una rivincita per l’ »occupazione sovietica » del XX secolo. Argomenti nuovi, geopolitica vecchia.

La Romania è uno dei Paesi della « Nuova Europa » e quindi fa oggettivamente parte di quel « cordone sanitario ». Di conseguenza, la scelta geopolitica della Romania è la seguente : o schierarsi dalla parte del continentalismo, in quanto essa è un Paese di antica identità europea, o attestarsi su posizioni atlantiste, adempiendo in tal modo alla funzione di « cordone sanitario » assegnatole dagli USA. La prima opzione implica, fra le altre cose, la costruzione di una politica di amicizia nei confronti della Russia, mentre la seconda comporta non solo un orientamento antirusso, ma anche una discrepanza rispetto alla geopolitica continentalista dell’Europa stessa, il che porta a un indebolimento della sovranità europea in favore degli USA e del mondo unipolare. Questa scelta geopolitica conferisce a Bucarest la più grande libertà di abbordare i problemi più importanti della politica internazionale.

La Grande Romania

Come possiamo intendere, in questa situazione, il progetto della costruzione geopolitica nazionalista della Romania, progetto analogo a quello noto col nome di « Grande Romania » ? In primo luogo si tratta della tendenza storica a costruire lo Stato nazionale romeno, tendenza sviluppatasi in condizioni storiche e geopolitiche diverse. Qui possiamo richiamarci alla storia, a partire dall’antichità geto-dacica e citando Burebista e Decebalo. In seguito sorsero i principati di Moldavia e di Valacchia, formazioni statali che esistettero in modo indipendente fino alla conquista ottomana.

Bisogna menzionare anche Michele il Bravo, che agli inizi del secolo XVII realizzò l’unione di Valacchia, Moldavia e Transilvania. Fu solo nel secolo XIX che la Romania conquistò la propria statualità nazionale, la quale venne riconosciuta nel 1878 al Congresso di Berlino. Il peso strategico della Romania è dipeso, anche nelle condizioni della conquista dell’indipendenza, dalle forze geopolitiche circostanti. Fu una sovranità relativa e fragile, in funzione dell’equilibrio estero di potenza, tra Sud (impero ottomano), Ovest (Austria-Ungheria, Germania, Francia, Inghilterra) ed Est (Russia). Di conseguenza, l’obiettivo “Grande Romania” rimase una “utopia geopolitica nazionale”, anche se ricevette un’espressione teorica integrale coi progetti di realizzazione di uno Stato romeno tradizionalista dei teorici della Guardia di Ferro (Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Horia Sima), mentre nel periodo seguente la Realpolitik di Bucarest fu obbligata, da forze di gran lunga superiori al potenziale della Romania, a operare una scelta: Antonescu fu attratto verso la Germania, Ceausescu verso l’Unione Sovietica.

Per rafforzare l’identità nazionale, l’”utopia nazionale” ed anche l’”utopia geopolitica”, è estremamente importante non rinunciare in nessun caso al progetto “Grande Romania”, ma non si prendono in considerazione gli aspetti concreti dell’immagine della carta geopolitica, poiché un appello all’”ideale” potrebbe essere un elemento di manipolazione, tanto più che la Romania non dispone, nemmeno di lontano, della capacità di difendere, in queste condizioni, la sua sovranità sulla Grande Romania nei confronti dei potenziali attori geopolitici a livello globale e regionale (USA, Europa, Russia).

5. La strumentalizzazione del nazionalismo romeno da parte dell’atlantismo

Una delle forme più evidenti di strumentalizzazione dell’idea di “Grande Romania” si manifesta ai giorni nostri, quando una tale idea viene utilizzata negli interessi dell’atlantismo. Ciò ha uno scopo evidente: il nazionalismo romeno (perfettamente legittimo e ragionevole di per sé) nella Realpolitik fa appello all’idea di integrazione della Repubblica di Moldavia. Sembrerebbe una cosa del tutto naturale. Ma questo legittimo desiderio dell’unione di un gruppo etnico in un solo Paese, nel momento in cui la Romania è membro della NATO, sposterebbe ulteriormente verso la Russia le frontiere di questa organizzazione e, in tal caso, le contraddizioni tra Mosca e l’Unione Europea – e l’Occidente in generale -  si esacerberebbero. In altri termini, l’utopia nazionale della “Grande Romania” si trasforma, nella pratica, in una pura e semplice estensione del “cordone sanitario”, la qual cosa non avverrebbe a beneficio dell’Unione Europea, bensì degli USA e dell’atlantismo. In questo contesto, il progetto atlantista mira in fin dei conti a privare l’Europa della sua sovranità, mostrando indirettamente il suo carattere antieuropeo o, quanto meno, anticontinentalista.

All’integrazione della Repubblica di Moldavia si aggiunge anche la Transnistria, che per la Russia rappresenta una posizione strategica in questa regione. Dal punto di vista strategico la Transnistria è molto importante per Mosca, non solo in quanto si tratta di una leva su cui essa può agire nelle relazioni a lungo termine con la Repubblica di Moldavia, ma, fatto più importante, nella prospettiva del probabile crollo dell’Ucraina e della sua divisione in due parti (orientale e occidentale), che prima o poi si verificherà per effetto della politica di Kiev successiva alla “rivoluzione arancione”. Nei Fondamenti della geopolitica c’è un capitolo sulla disintegrazione dell’Ucraina. Il capitolo in questione è stato scritto all’inizio degli anni NOvanta, ma, dopo la “rivoluzione arancione” del 2004, questa analisi geopolitica è diventata più esatta, più precisa. In una certa fase, la Transnistria diventerà un’importantissima base della Russia nella regione. In questa prospettiva, la Grande Romania diventa un ostacolo, cosa che gli strateghi atlantisti hanno previsto fin dall’inizio.

Le frizioni tra Romania e Ungheria, così come alcune frizioni con l’Ucraina, non sono importanti per gli atlantisti e questo aspetto del nazionalismo romeno non avrà il sostegno dell’atlantismo, a meno che ad un certo momento gli USA non pensino di poterlo utilizzare per destabilizzare la situazione secondo il modello della disintegrazione jugoslava.

Puntando sui sentimenti patriottici dei Romeni, gli operatori della geopolitica mondiale si sforzeranno di raggiungere il loro specifici obiettivi.

6. La Romania nel quadro del Progetto Eurasia

Adesso è possibile presentare, in poche parole, il modello teorico della partecipazione della Romania al Progetto Eurasia. Questo progetto presuppone che nella zona settentrionale del continente eurasiatico si stabiliscano due unità geopolitiche, due “grandi spazi”: quello europeo e quello russo. In un quadro del genere, l’Europa è concepita come un polo, come un’area di civiltà. A sua volta, la Russia comprende il Sud (Asia centrale, Caucaso) e l’Ovest (Bielorussia, Ucraina orientale, Crimea). Il momento più importante in un’architettura multipolare è l’eliminazione del “cordone sanitario”, questo perpetuo pomo della discordia controllato dagli Anglosassoni che è in contrasto sia con l’Europa sia con la Russia. Di conseguenza questi Paesi e questi popoli, che tendono oggettivamente a costituire la Nuova Europa, dovranno ridefinire la loro identità geopolitica. Tale identità si deve fondare su una regola principale: contemporaneamente accanto all’Europa e accanto alla Russia. L’integrazione in Europa e le relazioni amichevoli con la Russia: questo è il ponte che unisce i due poli di un mondo multipolare.

Tre Paesi dell’Europa orientale, possibilmente alleati degli altri, potrebbero adempiere a questo compito meglio di altri Paesi: la Bulgaria, la Serbia e la Romania. La Bulgaria è un membro dell’Unione Europea, è abitata da una popolazione slava ed è ortodossa. La Serbia non è un membro dell’Unione Europea, è abitata da Slavi, è ortodossa e tradizionalmente simpatizza per la Russia. Infine la Romania: Paese ortodosso, con una sua missione metafisica ed una accresciuta responsabilità per il destino dell’Europa. Alla stessa maniera, ma con certe varianti, si potrebbe parlare della Grecia. In tal modo la Romania potrebbe trovare una posizione degna di lei nel Progetto Eurasia, sviluppando qualitativamente lo spazio culturale e sociale che collega l’Est (Russia) con l’Ovest (Europa), spazio che assumerebbe l’identità dei Paesi ortodossi dell’Europa, mentre le caratteristiche distintive nazionali e culturali resterebbero intatte, vale a dire non si dissolverebbero nel mondo stereotipato del globalismo né si troverebbero sotto l’influenza del modo di vita americano, che annulla tutte le peculiarità etniche. Integrandosi nell’Unione Europea e stabilendo stretti legami con la Russia, la Romania potrà assicurare il proprio sviluppo economico e potrà conservare la propria identità nazionale.

Senza alcun dubbio, questo progetto richiede un’analisi attenta e deve costituire il risultato di uno sforzo intellettuale particolarmente serio da parte dell’élite romena, europea e russa.

7. Correzioni all’opera I fondamenti della geopolitica

Il libro è stato scritto per lettori russi, ma, come dimostrano le sue numerose traduzioni e riedizioni in altre lingue – specialmente in turco, arabo, georgiano, serbo ecc. – esso ha destato interesse anche al di fuori delle frontiere della Russia. Non bisogna dimenticare che esso è stato scritto negli anni Novanta del secolo scorso per quei Russi che, nel clima e nella confusione generale di riforme liberali e di espansione dell’Occidente, avevano perduto l’ideale nazionale; per lo più, infatti, esso riflette le realtà internazionali di quel periodo. Al di là di tutto questo, però, l’opera contiene riferimenti essenziali alle costanti della geopolitica – le quali sono identiche in ogni epoca – e, in modo particolare, allo spazio eurasiatico.

I principi enunciati nei Fondamenti della geopolitica sono stati sviluppati ed applicati alle nuove realtà storiche dei primi anni del XXI secolo e si ritrovano nelle mie opere successive: Progetto Eurasia, I fondamenti dell’Eurasia, La geopolitica postmoderna, La quarta teoria politica ecc.

I fondamenti della geopolitica si distingue per la presentazione del metodo geopolitico di base applicato al caso dell’Eurasia.

In diversi momenti successivi alla sua pubblicazione, il testo dei Fondamenti della geopolitica è stato riveduto, ogni volta sotto l’influenza degli eventi in divenire, e ciò ha indotto a chiarire certi punti di vista. In primo luogo, l’autore ha riveduto la sua posizione nei confronti della Turchia, posizione inizialmente negativa a causa dell’appartenenza della Turchia alla NATO, nonché dell’azione svolta negli anni Novanta dagli attivisti turchi nei Paesi della CSI. Verso la fine degli anni Novanta, però, la situazione della Turchia ha cominciato a cambiare, poiché alcuni membri dei gruppi kemalisti degli ambienti militari, così come l’élite intellettuale e molti partiti e movimenti politici si sono resi conto che l’identità nazionale turca è minacciata di scomparsa qualora Ankara continui ad eseguire gli ordini di Washington nella politica internazionale e regionale. Questi circoli sollevano un grande interrogativo, perfino per quanto concerne l’integrazione della Turchia nell’Unione Europea, proprio a causa dei timori relativi alla perdita dell’identità turca. I Turchi stessi parlano sempre più di Eurasia, vedendo in quest’ultima il luogo della loro identità, così come già fanno i Russi e i Kazaki. Per adesso i pareri sono discordi, non solo nell’élite politica, ma anche presso la popolazione. Ciò si riflette anche nel caso di alcuni dirigenti politici turchi (ad esempio il generale Tuncer Kilinc), che considerano la possibilità di ritirare la Turchia dalla NATO e di avvicinare la Turchia alla Russia, all’Iran e alla Cina nel nuovo contesto multipolare.

Di questa evoluzione della politica turca non c’è traccia nei Fondamenti della geopolitica; a tale argomento è completamente dedicato il recente lavoro L’Asse Mosca-Ankara. Nonostante i brani antiturchi, i Turchi hanno mostrato interesse nei confronti dei Fondamenti della geopolitica, che sono diventati un testo di riferimento ed un vero e proprio manuale per i dirigenti politici e militari, aprendo loro una nuova prospettiva sul mondo, non solo verso l’Occidente, ma anche verso Est.

Parimenti, nel libro non sono presi in esame la vittoria di Mosca in Cecenia, i fatti di New York dell’11 settembre 2001, i tentativi di creare un asse Parigi-Berlino-Mosca al momento dell’invasione americana in Iraq, la secessione del Kosovo e la guerra russo-georgiana dell’agosto 2008.

Ciononostante, il lettore attento dei metodi presentati nei Fondamenti della geopolitica avrà la possibilità di effettuare la propria analisi in relazione al Progetto Eurasia. La geopolitica è in grado di rispondere alle domande “che cosa” e “dove”, facendo sì che le risposte siano precise quanto più possibile. Ma, per quanto concerne un determinato momento del futuro, si capisce bene che le previsioni non possono essere altrettanto rigorose. La geopolitica descrive il quadro di manifestazione degli eventi in relazione con lo spazio, ma anche le condizioni e i limiti dei processi in divenire. Come sappiamo, la storia è una questione sempre aperta, per cui gli eventi che possono aver luogo nel loro quadro avverranno e si manifesteranno in modi diversi. Certo, gli eventi seguono il vettore della logica geopolitica, per allontanarsene qualche volta o addirittura per spostarsi su una direzione contraria. Ma anche questi allontanamenti recano in sé un senso e una spiegazione geopolitica, implicando tutta una serie di forze, ciascuna delle quali tende ad assumere i processi e gli avvenimenti a proprio vantaggio. Per questo si usano metodi diversi, al di fuori dell’esercito, che nei decenni passati aveva un ruolo essenziale, mentre adesso un ruolo più efficiente viene svolto dalla “rete” armata (guerra delle reti); quest’ultima ha l’obiettivo di stabilire un controllo sull’avversario ancor prima del confronto diretto, attraverso la cosiddetta “azione degli effetti di base”. In questa “guerra delle reti” la conoscenza o l’ignoranza delle leggi della geopolitica (e ovviamente di tutti gli effetti connessi) è determinante.

Quindi non c’è da meravigliarsi se proprio coloro che traggono il massimo vantaggio dai frutti della geopolitica dichiarano, rispondendo alla domanda circa la serietà di quest’ultima, che essi in linea di principio non si sottopongono ai suoi rigori.

(Trad. di C. Mutti)

* Aleksandr G. Dugin (n. 1962), dottore in filosofia e in scienze politiche, è rettore della Nuova Università, direttore del Centro Studi Conservatori dell’Università di Stato di Mosca, nonché fondatore del Movimento Eurasia. Il testo qui tradotto è la Prefazione scritta da A. Dugin per l’edizione romena dei Fondamenti della geopolitica (Bazele geopoliticii, Editura Eurasiatica, Bucarest 2011).

Alexander Dugin talks about the Conservative Revolution at Moscow State University

Alexander Dugin talks about the Conservative Revolution at Moscow State University